Water quality modelling, risk analysis and decision-making: an integrated study by Calder, RSD
  






A thesis in the Department of 






Presented in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  











© R.S.D. Calder, 2012 
 ii 
CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY 
School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
by:  Ryan Calder 
entitled: Water quality modelling, risk analysis and decision-making: an integrated study 
and submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
Master of Applied Science (Civil Engineering) 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality. 
 
Signed by the final examining committee: 
 
   ___________ Dr Zhi Chen______________ Chair 
___________Dr Georgios Vatistas___ ___ Examiner 
___________Dr Laleh Yerushalmi_______ Examiner 
 ____________Dr S Samuel Li___________ Supervisor 
 ____________Dr Ketra Schmitt__________ Supervisor 
 
 
Approved by _______Dr Maria Elektorowicz__________ 
 Graduate program director 
 
________ 2012 _______Dr Robin Drew_________________ 
 Dean of the Faculty of Engineering & Computer Science 
 iii 
ABSTRACT 
Water quality modelling, risk analysis and decision-making: an integrated study 
Ryan Calder 
Concordia University, 2012 
Falling detection limits, the proliferation of chemical contaminants and the rising population 
densities of the world’s watersheds are erasing the traditional conception of wastewater and 
drinking water as demarcated academic disciplines. This increased interconnectedness reflects 
increased awareness of the extent to which human activities impact water resources and to what 
extent these impacts are felt downstream. This text integrates the candidate’s contributions to the 
fields of industrial-scale wastewater treatment, municipal-scale wastewater management 
planning, and drinking water management and regulation made during his postgraduate studies. 
The collected works constitute a novel civil engineering dissertation that challenges the historic 
compartmentalization of subfields in water resources management. 
1) A new type of wastewater treatment system is modelled with traditional computational fluid 
dynamics (“CFD”) methods in order to optimize operating conditions and design features and to 
model its principal hydrodynamic characteristics.  
2) Risk analysis techniques are used to build a decision model for municipal-scale management of 
wastewater discharged to highly transient water bodies. A risk analysis framework uses 
environmental and economic impact valuations to translate CFD model output into concrete 
decisions about infrastructure investment. 
3) The claim that improved analytical ability leads to stricter regulations than justified by 
available toxicological data is evaluated with respect to drinking water. The relationships between 
historical and present maximum contaminant levels and goals are evaluated, and the overall 
drinking water regulatory apparatus is outlined. Analytical ability is demonstrated to have a weak 
effect on resulting regulation, and the tightening of regulations is shown to be unlikely in the 
absence of updates to the underlying toxicological model. 
4) Drinking water regulatory structures are compared with respect to their ability to protect public 
health in light of several widely reported outbreaks in Canada since 2000. Claims of inadequate 
government intervention and proposed alternative regulatory arrangements are contextualized 
using principles of risk perception and evaluated using principles of risk analysis.  
5) Drinking water regulation in the United States is deconstructed to understand to what extent 
the landscape of rules and standards reflects the balancing of risks with the costs and benefits of 
treatment. The research points to risk biases that make low-risk, high-occurrence contaminants 
more likely to be regulated than high-risk, low-occurrence contaminants. Decentralization along 
the lines of the Canadian model is shown to have the potential to improve water quality outcomes 
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INTRODUCTION 
One man’s wastewater is another man’s drinking water – almost. Although the 
hydrologic cycle tends to dilute wastewater so as to physically and conceptually 
differentiate it from drinking water, the demarcation between the two as distinct 
disciplines of research and management is disappearing.  
Concepts of drinking water treatment and wastewater discharge criteria are longstanding 
acknowledgements of the link between the two. However, this connection is largely 
implicit, and water resources management has traditionally been characterized by 
fragmentation between actors in drinking water procurement and treatment on the one 
hand and wastewater treatment and discharge on the other. Indeed, recognition of this 
fragmentation has led to the coalescence of the ‘Integrated Water Resources 
Management’ (IWRM) paradigm to improve coordination of land-use, wastewater and 
drinking water planning in an age of overstressed water resources (UN WWAP 2009).  
The IWRM has tended to frame thinking about protecting water resources in the 
developing world (e.g. Swatuk 2005; Goldin et al. 2008) where drinking water has 
become a primary vector for pathogens leading to short-term illness and death. However, 
the economic, social, technical, legislative and geographic barriers to adoption of an 
integrated strategy to water resources planning (Thomas and Durham 2003) have also 
been examined in the contexts of Canada (Creighton 1999; Roy et al. 2009; Shrubsole 
2004) and the United States (Ballweber 2006; Stakhiv 2003). Although the risks to 
drinking water supplies tend to be less dire in industrialized countries, understanding and 
overcoming the barriers to an integrated approach to water management is required in 
order to respond to the public’s expectations of water quality.  
Indeed, a number of well-publicized outbreaks in Canadian public water systems since 
2000 have reminded the public that industrialized countries are not immune to the public 
health and environmental issues most commonly associated with the developing world. 
Additionally, a universe of thousands of chemical drinking water contaminants owing 
almost entirely to the discharge of industrial effluents has been inventoried since the 
1970s. These contaminants largely represent increased risks of long-term illness, notably, 
different cancers.  
Improved analytical abilities now allow for routine detection of chemical contaminants in 
levels on the order of one part per billion. Over the past generation, we have become 
aware of widespread but vanishingly small concentrations of chemical contaminants in 
drinking water. Unfortunately, knowledge of dose-response profiles at these low levels is 
highly uncertain and poses a dilemma for decision-makers by making precautionary 
regulation increasingly demanding yet decreasingly likely to result in material protection 
of public health.  
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This represents a huge puzzle for public health decision-makers trying to optimize the 
allocation of finite resources to minimize incongruent (short-term versus long-term) and 
uncertain (long-term) public health risks. These challenges are perpetuated by a policy 
feedback loop: increased understanding of drinking water contamination often leads to a 
policy response, while regulations and policies are themselves instrumental in setting 
scientific research priorities (Schmitt and Calder 2011). A long-term vision to reconcile 
drinking water quality expectations and outcomes is a crucial dimension to an integrated 
approach to water resources management in the developed world. Much as in the 
developing world, developed countries have an emerging need for an integrated approach 
to water resources management. Whereas in the developing world, this is driven by 
immediate threats to human health, in the developed world, it is to ensure long-term 
efficiency in decision-making and fair reallocation of the burden of water treatment and 
resources protection from downstream consumers to upstream emitters.  
Environmental regulation in developed countries is criticised variously for not being 
sufficiently protective of public health and, conversely, for imposing stricter standards 
than are justified by available data. Wastewater and drinking water are not exceptional in 
this regard. However, they are distinct in being the only spheres of environmental 
management to require policy and technical intervention both by polluters and 
consumers: as we are coming to realize, one man’s wastewater is another man’s drinking 
water.  
٨ ٨ ٨  
The changing landscape of environmental management is especially relevant for 
engineers, who will be called upon to build, design and maintain the physical 
manifestations of an integrated approach to water management. It is therefore no longer 
sufficient for engineering decision-makers and managers to have a technical background 
limited to either drinking water or wastewater management; increased integration 
demands from tomorrow’s decision-makers an expertise that straddles the extant 
divisions of today.   
This thesis is the culmination of the candidate’s civil engineering research. Each chapter 
is an academic journal article either published, submitted for publication or in the final 
stages of preparation. The chapters represent novel research into different parts of the 
drinking water/wastewater continuum: small-scale wastewater treatment modelling, 
large-scale wastewater management decision-making and drinking water management 
decision-making. The chapters stand alone as independent paths of inquiry but, together, 
constitute a research program that has grounded the candidate in the wide foundations 
that underlie an integrated approach to water resources management.  
The progression of the five chapters of this thesis reflects the directionality of water as a 
medium that links human populations: micro-scale wastewater treatment, followed by 
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macro-scale sewage plume management upstream, then drinking water analysis and 
management downstream. It also provides continuity in terms of quantitative 
methodologies and a steady upward progression in the weight of qualitative discussion: 
the thesis opens with a traditional CFD study that is followed by the development of a 
framework to nest CFD within a risk-based decision model and concludes with risk-based 
policy analyses. 
٨٨٨ 
Chapter 1 describes a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model developed for a new 
type of wastewater treatment bioreactor for which a working lab-scale prototype exists. 
The model is first run under the conditions applied to the laboratory-scale prototype. The 
CFD output is compared to the laboratory output to validate the CFD model. Then, the 
model is modified variously in terms of operating conditions and geometry to study the 
effects of these changes on the flow pattern and operating characteristics and to thereby 
find the optimal setup. In addition to being vastly less resource-intensive than performing 
an equivalent number of tests on the laboratory-scale prototype, the CFD model yielded 
valuable information on the magnitude and location of turbulent eddies within the 
bioreactor. This work has been submitted to the Journal of Environmental Engineering as 
of the compilation of this thesis.  
Chapter 2 demonstrates how CFD models of transient, uncertain or probabilistic systems 
can be nested within a risk analysis framework to guide decision-making. A model for 
large-scale wastewater treatment decision-making is proposed for the highly transient 
environments of tidal waters. Two-dimensional numerical models of sewage plumes in 
such environments illustrate the high sensitivity of water quality to input parameters such 
as seasonal stratification and tidal condition that vary continuously with time. The model 
outlines how probabilistic methods would translate discrete snapshots of water quality 
under time-variable conditions into a quantitative, constant description of water quality 
that can be used to evaluate the costs of ecological and economic impacts. This research 
was been presented at the Society for Risk Analysis annual conference in 2011 and won 
the candidate the Student Merit Award in the Ecological Risk Assessment Specialty 
Group. It is in the final stages before submission to a journal. 
Chapter 3 is a quantitative policy analysis of the effects on improved analytical ability 
on drinking water regulation in the United States. It is the first study on the relative 
importance of detection ability, toxicological knowledge and cost factors in drinking 
water regulatory decision-making. This study was carried out to study claims from 
industry that better detection limits lead to regulation stricter than what is justified by 
toxicological data. We find that drinking water regulation is in fact driven primarily by 
improved knowledge of the dose-response profiles of contaminants and not by improved 
detection limits. However, improved detection ability is demonstrated to create more 
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targets for regulatory analysis which can subsequently lead to regulation. This work has 
been published in Environmental Science & Technology (Calder and Schmitt 2010).  
Drinking water quality management in Canada is based primarily on provincial/territorial 
intervention. This contrasts with the American and European approach of uniform, 
legally enforced regulation at the federal or super-federal level. The Canadian 
government has been widely criticized for not giving its drinking water quality guidelines 
legal effect. Chapter 4 investigates the principal arguments for legally binding federal 
drinking water guidelines for chemical contaminants, compares popular claims about 
water quality with available data and adds context with perspectives on risk perception 
and general principles in drinking water management. The work compares current and 
proposed regulatory frameworks in terms of their implications for protectiveness of 
public health, responsiveness to emerging contaminants and equity among populations. It 
shows that increasing the responsibility of the federal government could potentially 
restrict its ability to adopt health-protective drinking water quality standards, slow its 
reaction to emerging contaminants and undermine its goal to protect public health. This is 
contrasted with an analysis of the practical difficulties inherent in sub-national water 
regulation. The work concludes by identifying opportunities for data collection that 
would allow for more confident, definitive pronouncements on risks and benefits of 
different regulatory structures.  
Chapter 5 is an analysis of drinking water regulatory decisions made in the United States 
since the passage of the Safe Drinking Water Act. Two major shifts in the realm of 
drinking water regulation in the United States are shown to have occurred that, together, 
jeopardize the ability of centralized regulation to protect public health. The first is a shift 
in regulatory attention from contaminants relatively widespread and common to many 
urban areas to those that occur infrequently in a small number of water systems. The 
second is the entrenchment of the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) burden to 
demonstrate regulatory benefits on a national as opposed to a regional level for any 
proposed drinking water regulation. Continued protection of public health to a level 
established by past regulation depends on an acknowledgement by decision-makers of the 
challenges posed by the current centralized regulatory framework and the adoption of 
measures to bring regulatory decision-making into line with the nature of today’s 
contaminants and the public’s expectations of the distribution of risks and benefits. This 
work is in the final stages of editing before submission to a journal.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
The research program compiled in this thesis was carried out to ground the candidate in 
the broad foundations underlying an integrated approach to water resources management. 
Each of the five chapters of this thesis stands alone as a separate research question aimed 
at audiences in established wastewater and drinking management audiences. Chapters 3 
to 5, on drinking water, however directly address the theme of developing a long-term 
vision for water quality expectations, outcomes and management. 
Literature reviews are provided for each chapter separately. The reviews presented in this 
section summarize the work that has been done in and around areas of inquiry of each 
chapter, identifying primary sources and references, as well as the contribution of each 
chapter to its respective research community. This section is not an exhaustive overview 
of every reference cited by each chapter.  
٨ ٨ ٨  
Chapter 1:  Computational fluid dynamics model of a BioCAST multi-environment air-
lift bioreactor 
The wastewater treatment technology modelled in this research has undergone laboratory 
trials that have produced data on its contaminant removal performance (Yerushalmi et al. 
2011) and principal hydrodynamic characteristics (Behzadian 2010). There is a 
substantial body of literature on the use of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) to study 
air-lift bioreactors similar to, though usually simpler than, the one modelled in this 
research. This literature was valuable in providing other researchers’ perspectives on the 
aptness of different turbulence models to describe the physics of bioreactors and the 
relative importance of different physical characteristics. The majority of researchers (e.g. 
Van Baten et al. 2003; Mudde & Van Den Akker 2001) have used a two-phase (air/water) 
k-ε turbulence model. Some (e.g. Tabib et al. 2008) have used large eddy simulation 
(LES). Still others (e.g. Volker & Hempel 2002; Heijen et al. 1997) expanded the model 
to account for a dispersed solid phase. All of the work surveyed considered the flow in 
the bioreactor to be driven exclusively by the dispersed gas phase. A review of the 
literature found no hydrodynamic study of a wastewater reactor with a clarifier isolated 
from the circulating flow.  
Manuals and guidelines on best practices for CFD modelling were instrumental in 
creating the model (Chen & Jaw 1998; Ranade 2002; ANSYS 2009). The chemical 
engineering literature provided semi-empirical formulae and guidelines to facilitate 
making assumptions on various physical concepts such as bubble diameter and flow 
regimes that defined the physics input of the model (Akita & Yoshida 1974; Hills 1976; 
Levich 1962). 
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The model output was validated with respect to values reported in laboratory trials 
(Behzadian 2010) and standard estimates available in the literature for similar geometries 
(Bello et al. 1984; Chisti et al. 1988).  
Chapter 2:  A probabilistic decision-making framework for the management of sewage 
plumes in a tidal environment 
Hydrodynamic models have recently been developed to plot sewage plumes in tidal 
environments and illustrate the high sensitivity of the plume shape and dilution to time-
variable input parameters (e.g. Li & Hodgins 2010; Liu et al. 2008). This research 
provides a model for decision-making in such fundamentally probabilistic, extremely 
transient water systems. Our task is to understand how the discrete, representative model 
outputs provided by CFD research can be aggregated to describe water quality on 
average. 
A review of the literature reveals that decision analysis in water quality management has 
generally been confined to the development of strategies either to account for uncertainty 
of input parameters (sewage loading, wind speed, etc.) or the uncertainty of models used 
to translate physical predictions into ecological and economic impacts (Beck 1987; 
Bingham et al. 1995; Reckhow 1994). Decision analysis does not seem to have found a 
place structuring water resources decision-making in contexts that are not only or 
necessarily characterized by uncertainty but also by fundamental variability as is the case 
in tidal waters.  
This gap is perhaps due to the relatively recent accessibility of computing power that 
allows for a single study to comprise dozens of CFD simulations. Using traditional CFD 
methodology with point estimates for the input variables, a relatively large number of 
simulations are required to fully characterize the water body under the different 
combinations of values possible for the input variables. The gap may also reflect a lack of 
modelling tools to resolve highly transient water quality into a singular index that may be 
used for the purposes of impact valuations. Indeed, a review of the literature indicates 
that the phenomenon of variable water quality has not been explicitly explored. Instead, 
in cases of variable water quality, semi-arbitrary management decisions tend to prevail 
with respect to which modelling output (e.g. worst-case, 95th percentile) data are used for 
decision-making. This in turn may reflect the insensitivity of the dose-response models 
underlying impact valuations to the time-weighting of ecological and economic impacts.  
The framework built in this chapter aims to introduce decision analysis techniques into 




Chapter 3:  Role of Detection Limits in Drinking Water Regulation 
This research was inspired by claims by recurring claims by commentators in 
environmental science and policy that improved detection capabilities precipitate more 
stringent regulations. This phenomenon is sometimes termed ‘the vanishing zero effect’ 
or ‘detection limit creep’ (Elston 2005). This is the first academic study on the existence 
of this alleged phenomenon, although two other academic articles addressing it have been 
identified (Belluck & Benjamin 1993; Elston 2005). More commonly, the concept is 
mentioned indirectly in research articles assessing risk in regulatory decision-making or 
discussed at conferences (e.g. Long 2004; Rodricks 2001). At least one article in an 
industry trade journal predicts that detection limits would be the ‘dominating force’ of 
environmental regulations in the 1990s and beyond (Linstedt 1993). In some cases, the 
articles reviewed suggest that improved detection capability can itself motivate regulation 
at levels departing from available toxicological data (Elston 2005; Linstedt 1993).  
Previous research has been directed at this question from a technical perspective on a 
case-by-case basis; Ferguson et al. (2007) demonstrate the technical feasibility of 
lowering the practical quantitation limit (PQL) of arsenic, based on the detection ability 
afforded by a variety of commercially available technologies. Otherwise, researchers 
have commented tangentially that the detection limits required by the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA) are in fact below the associated health 
standards it sets, suggesting that, in some contexts, analytical capability is playing a 
decreasingly important role (Hamilton et al. 2003). Whatever the relationship to 
regulation, advances in analytical chemistry are a documented concern to stakeholders in 
environmental policy; Johns (2007) writes that it is necessary to consider the added costs 
of more advanced analytical procedures that would be borne by industries and small 
municipalities in the event that state regulators require them.  
Much of the analysis was based on US EPA’s two reviews of the technical feasibility of 
considering lowered detection limits in decision-making (2003, 2009a). Literature on 
contaminants that are candidates informed analysis on the likelihood of improved 
analytical abilities precipitating new regulations in the near future (US EPA 2009b). 
Literature on cost benefit analysis at US EPA (Morgenstern 1994) and drinking-water 
decision-making (NRC 1999) as well as technical literature on detection limits (Gibbons 
1994) was invaluable in outlining which contaminants are regulated, and to what levels.  
Chapter 4:  Drinking water regulation: risks, benefits and the hunt for equality in the 
Canadian context 
In 2005, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAGC) undertook two audits of 
federal engagement in drinking water quality, one with respect to Indian Reservations 
(OAGC 2005a) and one with respect to all other obligations and functions (OAGC 
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2005b). Most opportunities for improvement highlighted by the audits pertained to 
ensuring competent operation of small systems, adequate testing and sufficient funding, 
especially in Indian Reserves. One finding criticised the pace at which the federal 
Drinking Water Guidelines (that primarily pertain to chemical contaminants) are updated 
and developed. As of its 2009 report, the OAGC considers the federal government to 
have ‘made satisfactory progress’ with respect to the 2005 evaluation and noted the 
implementation of a process to improve the pace with which chemical contaminants are 
evaluated (OAGC 2009). A search of the federal government documentation reveals that 
the vast majority of publications fall into the following categories: outlines of upcoming 
research needs and identification of priority areas; resources for well-water users; 
conclusions of environmental assessments; technical information on select contaminants; 
summaries of international development initiatives; explanatory scientific material for the 
public; reviews of international commissions and agreements; and resources for 
agricultural workers. 
The environmental geography literature is rich with study and perspectives on overall 
water governance in Canada (e.g. Bakker 2002; de Loë et al. 2007). This body of 
literature focuses on source water management and responsibility with respect to the 
institutional, legal, geographic, economic, social and environmental challenges that face 
decision-makers. Academic literature on drinking water safety focuses heavily on control 
of pathogenic contamination and effective operation of municipal treatment facilities (e.g. 
Hrudey and Hrudey 2004; Hrudey et al 2006; Hrudey 2011; Schuster et al 2005) and 
source-water protection (e.g. Davies and Mazumder 2003) as opposed to risk 
management of chemical contaminants or the structure of drinking water regulations 
across jurisdictions. Policy questions in the context of drinking water are typically 
confined to the current context of provincial and territorial responsibility (as in McMullan 
and Eyles 1999). One paper however identifies several potential shortcomings in the 
regulatory mechanisms intended to ensure water quality from the perspective of 
environmental law (Pardy 2004). Hill et al. (2008) wrote a paper specifically addressing 
the lack of literature on Canada’s unique, highly decentralized water regulatory model. 
While this article was not specific to drinking water regulation, the authors inventoried 
the drinking water management practices of each province and territory and put Canada 
in the context of the primary scholarly arguments for and against centralization of 
environmental regulation.  
On the other hand, there are not many studies structured as specific policy analyses of the 
jurisdictional issues involved in drinking water regulation in the Canadian context. This 
is at least partially due to the fact that shared water governance in Canada is still in its 
formative stages (Nowlan and Bakker 2010). Notably, a review of the literature did not 
uncover any discussion on alternative arrangements for administration of standards for 
chemical contaminants. Although pathogenic contamination of drinking water leads to 
short-term illness and death and therefore represents a more immediate concern for 
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drinking water decision-makers, the associated standards and quality goals are well 
established. On the other hand, developing and enforcing standards for chemical 
contaminants is an extremely complicated and resource-intensive exercise. Chemical 
contaminants also attract the attention of environmental advocacy groups to a level that 
often exceeds the interest they direct at safeguarding water from microbiological 
contamination.  
This paper is close in scope to the work of Hill et al. (2008). However, it zooms in on 
drinking water regulation, risk perception and management and the administration of 
chemical contaminants. This paper is also unique in explicitly addressing the claims 
made by leading environmental groups regarding drinking water management.  
Chapter 5: Drinking water regulatory decision-making: sensitivity to contaminant 
occurrence and regulatory philosophy in the United States 
The highly centralized drinking water regulatory system in place in the United States is 
studied to understand how its risk abatement has varied over time, and how the current 
regulatory setup responds to emerging contaminants. This evolution is put in the context 
of the changing spatial distribution of contaminants: whereas the first chemical 
contaminants regulated were common to large swaths of the country, contaminant 
occurrence in drinking water is becoming increasingly system-specific. The response to 
this changing landscape by lower levels of government is also evaluated to understand 
how the apparatus as a whole is adapting to this changing context.  
This analysis is facilitated almost entirely by data published since the 1960s by US EPA 
and its predecessors. A review of the literature found no similar study on the evolution of 
water resources risk management over time.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Computational fluid dynamics model of a BioCAST multi-environment air-lift 
bioreactor1 
A computational model was developed to study the hydrodynamic characteristics of a 
new multi-environment air-lift bioreactor known as BioCAST. This CFD study 
considerably expands on the laboratory experiments by exploring the hydrodynamic 
characteristics of multiple combinations of geometries and operating conditions and by 
providing a visual illustration of the liquid-phase flow patterns. The model was first 
tested against preliminary laboratory results to ensure its validity. This included 
comparing two simplified geometries for the three-disc prototype air sparger assembly in 
order to determine which led to results closer to laboratory measurements. A torus 
geometry was found to better represent the prototype than a single disc. The model was 
then modified to evaluate the hydrodynamic characteristics of alternative operating 
conditions and physical geometries beyond what would be possible in the laboratory.  
The flow pattern in the outer clarifier zone was shown to be very sensitive to the 
geometry of the reactor wall separating the clarifier from the inner microaerophillic zone. 
Establishing a smooth, upward flow pattern in the clarifier was shown to be possible only 
when the clarifier was sufficiently shielded from the circulation in the anoxic cone below.  
1.1  Introduction 
A multi-environment wastewater treatment technology has recently emerged as a 
technology for high-rate removal of carbonaceous contaminants together with 
nitrogenous and phosphorous nutrients. The technology is known as BioCAST and 
consists of two interlinked bioreactors. The first bioreactor, explored in this research, 
integrates aerobic, microaerophilic and anoxic conditions and is based on conventional 
airlift designs. This system offers high removal efficiencies of carbon and nitrogen under 
substantially simpler operation procedures and while producing far less sludge than 
traditional approaches relying on unit processes in series (Yerushalmi et al. 2011). The 
liquid circulation within and between the environments is driven by the inflow of air from 
a sparger at the base of the aerobic zone, located in the centre of the first bioreactor. The 
microbiological activity in bioreactors is dependent on aeration levels, mixing and shear 
rates (Ma et al. 2003). These hydrodynamic characteristics are in turn dependent on 
reactor geometry and operating conditions as investigated by other authors who have 
developed computational or laboratory-scale models (e.g. Camarasa et al. 2001). 
The present research uses computational fluid dynamics (CFD) methods to model the 
principal hydrodynamic characteristics of the first BioCAST reactor on a laboratory scale 
                                                 
1 This chapter is the basis for a journal paper with the same title co-authored by SS Li & L Yerushalmi, 
submitted to the Journal of Environmental Engineering in March 2012. 
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and explores the effects of variable operating conditions and geometry. This is the first 
study to use CFD to examine the hydrodynamic characteristics of the BioCAST reactor. 
CFD allows for greater insight into the particularities of the flow patterns in the reactor 
and allows for study of many combinations of operating conditions and geometries. The 
time and cost required to carry out a similar study on the physical prototype would have 
been prohibitively high. This research first reproduces the geometry and conditions 
studied in laboratory trials both to validate model outputs against experimental 
observations and to quantify flow patterns, pressure and gas holdup contours and other 
hydrodynamic information that could not be evaluated over the entire domain in the 
laboratory. We then vary reactor and air sparger geometry, wastewater loading and gas 
inflow rate in order to assess the effects of these parameters on the hydrodynamic 
characteristics that in turn control reactor performance. 
CFX by ANSYS (2010) was used to define reactor geometry, overlay a computational 
mesh and solve the turbulence model we developed over the flow domain. The post-
processing tool was used to visualize the results, generate graphics and produce output 
files tabulating the spatial distribution of velocity and pressure.  
We find good agreement between the results of the computational fluid dynamics (CFD) 
model and laboratory trials. Significantly, the model demonstrates the difficulty of 
achieving smooth, upward flow in the outermost clarifier zone, a feature unique to this 
design. The isolation of this region from the air-driven flow through the inner aerobic and 
microaerophillic zones translates into a substantially slower current dominated by 
throughput of wastewater on its way out of the reactor. The flow in the clarifier is easily 
influenced by the shear of fast, circulating fluid in the anoxic cone below. We therefore 
demonstrate that geometry and operating conditions must be carefully controlled in order 
to ensure smooth flow in the clarifier and sedimentation of biological flocs.  
The multi-environment BioCAST reactor studied here has an outer anaerobic clarifier 
that is isolated from the air-driven flow circulating between the interior aerobic and 
microaerophillic zones. The substantially slower flow in the clarifier therefore has the 
potential to be influenced by the eddies in the adjacent zones that exert shear forces on 
the bottom of the clarifier domain and by the wastewater throughput that, under some 
operating conditions, may have a significant impact on the flow pattern in the clarifier. It 
is primarily these peculiarities of the outer clarifier that distinguish the model developed 
here from models of wastewater reactors developed over the past ten to twenty years. 
These past studies have, in contrast, examined relatively simple internal- and external-
loop geometries, typically with two-phase liquid/dispersed gas flow domains. The k-ε 
turbulence model has been used almost exclusively by CFD researchers, with a minority 
opting for large eddy simulation (LES) (Tabib et al. 2008). Some studies expand the flow 
domain to include a dispersed solid phase, e.g. (Volker & Hempel 2002, Heijnen et al. 
1997). All of the work surveyed has considered the flow to be driven entirely by air input. 
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The effectiveness of air-lift systems for wastewater treatment derives from the use of 
rising gas both for agitation and aeration. The system can be constructed so as to direct 
flow through variably aerated zones of different biological activity with greater 
turbulence, less shear stress and lower energy costs than comparable impeller-driven 
technologies (Vial et al. 2002). The turbulent conditions that allow these operational 
advantages come at the cost of modelling difficulties, described in further detail below. 
Considerable research has been directed at turbulence modelling over the past century 
(Chen & Jaw 1998). This work is in part an example of this effort.    
1.2 Geometry and mesh generation 
The bioreactor was created in CFX DesignModeler based on the dimensions of the 
laboratory-scale unit as shown in Figure 1.1. A 90-degree model with two planes of 
symmetry allowed for design, meshing and computation to be carried out on one quarter 
of the reactor and extended to the full cylindrical shape. The model is therefore assumed 
to be symmetrical with respect to the two faces of the 90-degree wedge. Figure 1.2 
provides an overview of the 90-degree wedge modelled in CFX. Certain elements of this 
model were modified in some runs, as described in Section 1.6: Model run and results. 
The horizontal spout between the aerobic and microaerophilic zones was modelled as one 
3-cm-radius 30-cm-long extrusion breaching the wall, centred at 45 degrees from both 
planes of symmetry. The outlet from the clarifier is not modelled geometrically but 
corresponds to the top surface of the clarifier zone.   
A small wedge of radius 5 cm was defined in the middle of the top surface of the aerobic 
zone to allow for two boundary conditions: water inlet through the central wedge and 
degassing around the wedge on the remaining surface. CFD models developed for 
reactors of other geometries have tended to omit hydrodynamic effects of throughput, e.g. 
(Volker & Hempel 2002), likely on account of its much lesser influence on the flow 
pattern relative to the effect of inflowing air. However, inclusion of wastewater 
throughput allows us to confirm the effects of varied wastewater flow on the 
hydrodynamic characteristics of the reactor, particularly in the outermost clarifier zone, 
which is isolated from the air-driven flow of the aerobic, microaerophilic and anoxic 
zones. An unstructured grid with an element size of 9 mm was generated over the reactor 
domain. Including geometric protrusions for these inlet and outlet zones facilitated the 
definition of boundary conditions. Including them in the model domain appears to have 
very little effect on model output (Ranade 2002). 
The air sparger apparatus used in the laboratory prototype reactor was of complex 
geometry approximating three rings centred over a solid pump apparatus at the base of 
the aerobic zone.  In the laboratory prototype, air was introduced through 63 circular 
holes of diameter 1 mm distributed over the surface of the reactor. Because these inlet 
ports were smaller than the diameter of the bubbles in the fluid and because the two-
 13 
phase dispersed gas fluid has not been realized at the boundary of the air inlet ports, it 
was not realistic to model flow at the ports. Therefore, simplified sparger geometries 
were used: in the first eight runs, the air sparger was modeled as a single 7.6-cm-radius 
cylinder within the aerobic zone with its base at the bottom of the wall between the 
aerobic and microaerophilic zones and extending upwards 6 cm. The aerobic and 
microaerophillic zones therefore communicate through a 1.4-cm-thick circular envelope 
around the edge of the sparger, down the base of the wall between the two zones. In the 
remaining 16 runs, the sparger was modelled as a torus of outer radius 6.6 cm and inner 
radius 2.4 cm (therefore with a circular cross section of radius 2 cm). In this case, the 
aerobic and microaerophillic zones communicated through the centre of the sparger, a 
circle of diameter 4 cm, and between the outer edge of the sparger and the base of the 
microaerophillic zone, a ring of outer radius 9 cm and inner radius 7 cm. Six of the runs 
with torus sparger geometry corresponded to runs that had used a cylindrical sparger and 
were conducted to test model sensitivity on the different sparger assumption. The 
conditions used in all runs are specified in Table 1.1. 
1.3 Fluid domain and model physics 
The reactor volume was modelled as a two-phase, isothermal mixture of air at 25°C 
dispersed in liquid water as bubbles with a uniform diameter. This hydrodynamic model 
essentially corresponds to the homogeneous ‘bubbly flow’ regime described in chemical 
engineering literature (Ishii & Hibiki 2011). The prevailing flow regime in a bubble 
column varies between this homogeneous condition and heterogeneous slug and churn 
turbulent flows as a function of superficial gas velocity, gas rise velocity and column 
diameter (Shah et al. 1982). However, the present hydrodynamic model does support 
heterogeneous flow conditions and will in all cases force bubbly flow. Therefore, the 
model inputs and outputs must be manually validated with respect to the conditions for 
bubbly flow to ensure that the homogeneous fluid domain model is an appropriate 
starting point for computing the hydrodynamic conditions of the reactor.  
We find in the literature estimates on the limits of bubbly flow in terms of maximum 
superficial gas velocity (ug,s) (Fair 1967):
 
0.05  m s<g,su   and maximum and minimum 
rise velocity (ug,r) (Levich 1962): 0.18 0.30 m s<< g,ru .  For column diameters greater 
than 10 cm, bubbly flow is confined to superficial gas velocities lower than 0.05 m s-1 
and is transitional up to about 0.07 m s-1 (Hills 1976). 
The superficial and rising gas velocity fields predicted by the hydrodynamic model for 
different conditions must be compared with these guidelines to ensure the validity of the 
dispersed gas phase model and hence the model output in general. Experimental trials 
confirmed that bubbly flow exists at least within the range of 10 to 70 L min-1 of gas 
input (Behzadian 2010).  
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The bubble diameter (db) was estimated based on the correlation proposed by Akita and 





















Where DC is column diameter, ρ is density, ν is molecular kinematic viscosity and 
subscripts L and g denote liquid and gas phases respectively. σ denotes the interfacial 
tension between liquid and gas phases and was set equal to 0.072 N m-1.  
According to this relationship, the bubble diameter changes as a function of superficial 
gas velocity which, in turn, is variable with respect to space. However, bubble diameter 
does not appear to have a significant effect on the hydrodynamic model, as reported in a 
previous investigation that the velocity is practically independent of bubble diameter in 
the 3 to 8 mm range (Van Baten et al. 2003). Inspection of equation 1 furthermore reveals 
that bubble diameter is insensitive to changes in superficial gas velocity. Increasing and 
decreasing the superficial gas velocity by a factor of ten leads to a change in bubble 
diameter of -26% and +32% respectively. Given the small variations in bubble diameter 
with respect to superficial gas velocity and the small effect of variable bubble diameter 
on computational output, we consider it acceptable to use one bubble diameter over the 
entire model domain for a given gas inflow rate (Qair). For a given inflow rate, the bubble 
diameter used over the flow domain was determined by substituting a single point 
estimate for the order of the superficial gas velocity into equation 1. This estimated 
superficial gas velocity was found by dividing gas inflow rate by the area of the riser 
section, producing values that agree well with experimental data (Behzadian 2010). Table 
1.2 sets out the bubble diameters used under different air inflow rates. 
Effects of buoyancy between the gas and liquid phases were included, assuming an 
acceleration due to gravity equal to 9.81 m s-2 in the negative z direction and a reference 
density of 997 kg m-3.  
A reference pressure of 0 was used as the pressure datum, so all pressures were absolute.  
1.4 Computational model 
The Navier-Stokes equations describe exactly the motion of fluids on scales that satisfy 
the assumption. These equations of conservation of mass and momentum are reproduced 
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ρτνρ ,  i = 1, 2, 3 (3) 
where t = time; uj = j’th component of the Reynolds-averaged velocity vector 
>=< 311 u,u,uu ; xj = coordinates; p = Reynolds-averaged pressure; τij = specific 
Reynolds shear stress;  Fi = the sum of body forces other than momentum exchange in 
the xi-direction; (FME)i  =  i’th component of the sum of momentum exchange body 
forces. Note that the above equations describe the motions of liquid and gas phases 
separately.They are related through the momentum exchange term, which is equal and 
opposite between liquid and gas.  
The nonlinearity of these equations makes them unsolvable for almost all scenarios of 
practical interest. Numerical solution is possible by way of so-called Direct Numerical 
Simulation (DNS). However, the computational mesh in DNS models must cover the 
entire range of length scales, from the smallest energy-dissipating eddies on the 
Kolmogorov scale to the largest energy-carrying eddies on the integral scale, because it 
directly solves all motion in the solution domain. Furthermore, it is not possible to use 
symmetry boundary conditions to facilitate computation because instantaneous flow is 
not symmetrical in the turbulent regime (Baumert et al. 2005). Therefore, the 
computational effort required for DNS increases rapidly with model complexity and is 
not usually a feasible basis for CFD research. Indeed, alternative models developed 
throughout the 20th century are vastly less computationally demanding and have been 
demonstrated to provide good approximations of fluid motion under a wide range of 
contexts. 
The models used in the present research are based on the Reynolds averaged Navier-
Stokes equations (RANS) which resolve velocity vectors from equation 3 into average 





u u u  (4) 
The ensuing algebra leaves the Navier-Stokes unchanged except for the substitution of u  
for u and the addition of an apparent stress term to equation 3: 
ρ ′ ′=
ij i j
τ u u  (5) 
This approach transforms the Navier-Stokes equations into describing motion on the 
scale of the average velocities only, with the exception of the the apparent stress term 
described in equation 5. This effectively introduces another unknown into the equations 
and leads to the well known ‘closure problem’ of turbulence, which many different 
models of varying degrees of complexity have been developed to resolve. The family of 
RANS models used in the present research assume that turbulent eddies behave like 
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molecules, and that their collisions and exchanges of momentum can be described in 
terms of a so-called eddy viscosity (µt) (Ranade 2002). These linear eddy viscosity 
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u u  (6) 
Where 1ijδ =  if  i j= , and 0ijδ =  if i j≠ , and where k is the turbulent kinetic energy per 
unit mass. The turbulence models used for the air and liquid phases differ however in 
how they approximate eddy viscosity.  
The well-known k-ε turbulence model was used for the liquid phase. This model accounts 
for history effects of turbulence (e.g. convection and diffusion of turbulent energy) by 
describing the eddy viscosity of the liquid phase (
,t Lµ )  in terms of turbulent kinetic 
energy per unit mass (k) and turbulence dissipation rate (ε) according to equations 7 to 9 
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Where 
,t Lµ  is the molecular viscosity of the liquid phase and Cµ, kσ , εσ , 1Cε  and 2Cε are 
constants. Pk represents the production of turbulence by viscous forces and is modelled as 
in equation 10. Pkb and Pεb represent the production and dissipation of turbulence by 
buoyancy, respectively, and are modelled as in equation 11 and equation 12.  
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Because the liquid phase is considered to be isothermal and incompressible, having 
everywhere a density gradient of 0, there is no buoyancy and hence no buoyancy 
turbulence.  
Whereas the foregoing equations are solved numerically to approximate the stress tensor 
for the liquid phase, a simpler model was used for the dispersed bubbles: a dispersed-
phase zero-equation model was applied to the gas phase, which defines gas eddy 
viscosity (









=  (13) 
Where Prσ  is a turbulent Prandtl number. 
If the particle relaxation time of the dispersed gas phase is much smaller than the 
turbulent dissipation time scale, TD, it is permissible to set the kinematic eddy viscosity of 
the gas phase equal to that of the liquid phase, i.e. to assume a turbulent Prandtl number 
equal to 1 (ANSYS 2009). In the case where τ approaches TD it is preferable to assume a 
turbulent Prandtl number greater than 1, hence decreasing the estimate of the kinematic 
eddy viscosity of the gas phase relative to that of the liquid phase.  
Equations 14and 15 describe the particle relaxation time (Ranade 2002) and turbulent 
dissipation time scales, respectively, where the latter is approximated by the ratio 
between the diameter of the aerobic riser zone (Da) and the rising gas velocity. Rising gas 
velocity was in turn calculated by dividing superficial gas velocity by the gas hold-up 
(εg), where the order of the superficial gas velocity is estimated as for the bubble diameter 
calculation based on equation 1. This provides an estimate for the timescales of the 
largest and most energy-carrying turbulent eddies, namely, those with a length scale on 
the order of the diameter of the riser column and a velocity scale on the order of the speed 




















Several equations for calculating gas holdup as a function of superficial gas velocity are 
in wide use for different geometries and conditions (Tabib et al. 2008). Hughmark 
provides one such equation applicable to the dimensions of the riser column, reproduced 
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The particle relaxation time is a function of the slip velocity between air and liquid 
phases, which varies in space in a way that is largely unknown a priori. In order to 
produce a conservative (high) estimate for τ, we consider a minimum slip velocity. This 
is taken to be equal to the difference between the maximum liquid velocity and minimum 
gas velocity, under the assumption that the gas phase has everywhere a higher velocity 
than the liquid phase, on the basis that the liquid phase is agitated by inflowing air. The 
maximum liquid velocity considered is equal to the point estimate for gas rising velocity, 
higher than the velocity actually acquired by the liquid phase via the mechanism of 
momentum exchange, but a satisfactory approximation for this purpose. The minimum 
gas velocity considered is equal to the highest velocity attained under acceleration due to 
buoyancy with an initial velocity equal to the gas rising velocity at the sparger. The 
significant effects of momentum exchange between the gas and liquid phases, which 
significantly slows the gas, is neglected in order to produce a conservative (high) estimate 
for maximum gas velocity.   
Table 1.2 presents the results from the calculations and finds the particle relaxation time 
to be roughly an order of magnitude smaller than the turbulent dissipation timescales. We 
are therefore justified in setting the turbulent Prandtl number equal to 1 in the dispersed-
phase zero-equation turbulence model used for the gas phase. This analysis is only 
relevant to the riser column, because the gas holdup and hence the effects of momentum 
transfer and buoyancy-induced turbulence are very small in the other regions of the 
reactor.  
The rise velocity of an air bubble within a continuous liquid phase is determined by its 
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Where mb is the mass of an individual bubble under analysis and FME is the sum of 
momentum exchange forces, including buoyancy. FD, FL, FTD, FWL and FVM represent 
drag, lift, turbulent dispersion, wall lubrication and virtual mass components of 
momentum exchange, respectively. As indicated in equation 3, this term is equal and 
opposite in the liquid and gas phases. Virtual mass force was however neglected; other 
bubble column modellers have concluded that the marginal benefits of accounting for the 
virtual mass force are outweighed by convergence problems and significantly longer 
computation times (Kamali et al. 2007). Similarly, we have omitted the wall lubrication 
component of momentum exchange, as the improved precision in the near-wall region is 
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likely to be insignificant given the error introduced by considering a free-slip wall 
boundary condition and therefore not worth the added computational effort. 




D L BC Aρ= −D r,g LF u u  (18) 
Where AB is the effective bubble diameter and CD is the drag coefficient. Instead of 
prescribing one value of CD for all grid points and timesteps in the simulation, the Grace 
model was applied (Yeoh & Tu 2010). The drag coefficient was thus calculated 
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The reference viscosity, µref , in equation 22 is that of water at 25°C. Because the liquid 
phase is modelled as water at 25°C, the quotient µL/µref equals 1.   
CFX supports different models for lift generated by rotational movement of one fluid 
around the other, in this case, rotational movement of water around elements of air. The 
standard equation for lift is reproduced in equation 23. 
( ) ( )L L gC ερ= − × ∇×L g,r L LF u u u  (23) 
Where CL is the lift coefficient. The model proposed by Legendre and Magnaudet for 
spherical bubbles in viscous linear shear flow (Legendre & Magnaudet 1998) was used to 
calculate CL at every timestep. The authors produce lift coefficients for different strain 
rates in the range range 0.1 ≤  Re ≤  5 and demonstrate independence of strain rate for 
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higher Reynolds numbers as well as a general flattening out of the lift coefficient through 
Reynolds numbers on the order of 1000.  
The empirical correlation between Reynolds number and lift coefficient for the range Re 















The standard Lopez de Bertodano lift model was used, as reproduced in equation 25 
(Lopez de Bertodano 1998):  
( )
gLTD kC ερ −∇= 1F  (25) 
Where CTD is the turbulent dispersion coefficient. The variable k describes turbulent 
kinetic energy of the liquid phase for both liquid and gas phase momentum exchange 
equations. Equation 26 describes the calculation of CTD. Table 1.2 presents the values 

















Where Cµ is the same constant as in equation 7. The k-ε model sets this value to 0.09.  
1.5 Boundary conditions 
Boundary conditions were programmed so as to approximate the behaviour of the 
laboratory-scale reactor.  
Conditions at the air sparger were approximated by modelling uniform airflow through 
the surface of the sparger at the base of the aerobic zone. Air inflow speeds were 
calculated to correspond to bulk flows of 10, 30, 50 and 70 litres per minute across the 
disc area of 0.02 m² in the case of the cylindrical sparger and 0.01 m² in the case of the 
torus sparger (air inlet defined as the surface a 45° wedge cut into the torus).  The liquid 
phase inflow fraction was set to 0. We note that this does not have the effect of setting the 
boundary condition to 0% water at the sparger; after the simulation, it was found that 
within one grid space, the air fraction at the height of the sparger is close to the 
approximate values listed in Table 1.1 and the experimental values reported in by 
Behzadian (2010). 
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CFX allows for the values of k and ε to be set manually at the inlet, or to automatically 
scale the intensity of turbulence based on the ratio between the magnitudes of the 
fluctuating and average parts of the Reynolds averaged Navier-Stokes (RANS) equations. 
This ratio was set to the default of 5%.  
The entire surface of the reactor, with the exception of a small wedge used for wastewater 
inlet, was considered to be open to air at 1 atm allowing for exit of the gas phase, but not 
the liquid phase.  
A 5-cm-radius wedge in the middle of the reactor was considered as the liquid-phase inlet 
area. The inflow was varied between 0 to 720 L day-1 to study its effect on the 
hydrodynamic characteristics of the reactor. 
At the top of the clarifier zone, defined as the liquid outlet boundary, a pressure of 1 atm 
and normal flow direction was specified.  
A free-slip wall was considered for the liquid and gas phases, based on the coarseness of 
the mesh size relative to the dimensionless wall distance.  
Two planes of symmetry allowed a 90-degree wedge of the reactor to serve as a model 
for the entire cylindrical shape.  
1.6 Model runs and results 
The model was run a total of 25 times with varying operating conditions and geometry to 
study the resulting differences in hydrodynamic characteristics of the reactor. The runs 
were roughly grouped in order to examine the effects of modifying the value of a single 
input parameter while holding the others constant. Runs 1 to 8 modelled the air sparger as 
a solid cylinder, and Runs 9 to 25 modelled the sparger as a torus. Runs 1 and 3 to 5 
(cylinder sparger) and 9 to 12 (torus sparger) varied the air inflow rate while holding the 
wastewater flow rate constant. Runs 6 to 8 (cylinder sparger) and 13 to 18 (torus sparger) 
varied the wastewater flow rate while holding the air inflow rate constant at 30 L min-1.  
Runs 19 to 25 varied the geometry in other ways while holding both air and wastewater 
flow rates constant. Runs 8 (cylinder sparger) and 18 (torus sparger) used the geometry 
and operating conditions from the reactor set-up, including a wastewater flow 
rate of 720 L day-1.  The values of all parameters for each run are indicated in Table 1.1, 
and the select hydrodynamic characteristics in Table 1.3.  
The output of the runs most closely approximating the experimental set-up was compared 
to experimental results. Liquid circulation time around the aerobic and microaerophillic 
zones was calculated from reactor output data for these two runs and compared with the 
circulation time calculated experimentally. The experimental liquid circulation time at air 
inflow rate of 30 L min-1 was 33 s, and dependence on wastewater flow rate was not 
studied in the laboratory (Behzadian 2010). A circulation time of 90.2 s was calculated 
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from the output of Run 8 (cylinder sparger) and 48.9 s from Run 18 (torus sparger), both 
of which modelled wastewater flow rates of 720 L day-1. Run 6 (cylinder sparger) and 
Run 13 (torus sparger) yielded circulation times of 31.3 s and 25.10 s, respectively. The 
effects on the circulation time of varying the wastewater throughput rate were further 
studied by conducting Runs 6 and 7 for the cylinder sparger and Runs 13 to 17 for the 
torus sparger. Although runs conducted with no wastewater flow yield circulation times 
agreeing better with experimental results, we see no correlation between wastewater flow 
rate and circulation time.  
Experimental results showed circulation time to be a parameter very sensitive to 
geometry and air inflow rates. For example, reducing the diameter of the port between the 
aerobic and microaerophillic zones by 50% leads to an increase in liquid circulation time 
of between 174% and 205% for the range of air inflow rates studied. The variations in 
calculated circulation time among runs with a variable wastewater flow rate are all less 
than ± 50% around the mean values of 61.3 s (cylinder sparger) and 41.7 s (torus 
sparger). Because the variations in circulation time calculated are small compared to the 
variations caused by minor changes in reactor geometry, and because they show no trend 
with respect to the wastewater flow rate, we consider the variations we observe to be 
artefacts of the computational model. We further observe that the circulation time 
calculated from the model compares very well with the experimental results, particularly 
where the sparger is modelled as a torus.  
Further comparisons were made between the average vertical velocities in the aerobic 
zone calculated from the model and values suggested by Chisti et al. (1988) and Bello et 
al. (Bello et al. 1984). The average velocities for Runs 6 and 13, which had no 
wastewater flow, air inflow of 30 L min-1 and used cylinder and torus sparger geometry 
respectively, are both within 5% of the value of 0.15 m/s suggested by Chisti et al. (Chisti 
et al. 1988). The other runs agree reasonably well in the same way, and all but three show 
average vertical velocities within 50% of the values suggested by Chisti et al. for the 
relevant air inflow rates (Chisti et al. 1988). The velocities suggested by Bello et al. are 
roughly an order of magnitude higher than the model output (Bello et al. 1984). We 
observe no correlation between average vertical velocity in the aerobic zone and 
prescribed wastewater inflow rate, and the differences between Runs 6 to 8 (cylinder 
sparger) and 13 to 18 (torus sparger) are likely artefacts of the computational model.  
The clarifier zone is considered to have no dispersed gas fraction, an assumption easily 
validated by checking the clarifier gas holdup in the model output. Therefore, the 
theoretical mean vertical velocity in the clarifier zone is equal to the liquid throughput, 
equal to the wastewater throughput, divided by its cross sectional area. Even at maximum 
flow rate, the theoretical average velocity is less than 1E-04 m s-1, too small to be 
adequately resolved by the model used. The mean vertical velocities computed in the 
clarifier zone are therefore not reliable measures of model performance or accuracy. 
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Indeed, the output of several runs indicates a mean vertical velocity in the clarifier that is 
slightly negative, i.e. downward, despite the mean upward direction being required by the 
principle of continuity. The velocity residence times calculated for the clarifier are not 
included in Table 1.3. 
Circulation time and mean velocities are important for judging the accuracy of the model 
we have developed as well as for evaluating microbiological treatment and wastewater 
characteristic requirements implied by other designs the model can be adapted to 
simulate. Similarly, hydrodynamic characteristics such as turbulence, circulation pattern 
and flow direction have implications for model performance and loading and treatment 
requirements under different operating conditions. This study examines these other 
hydrodynamic characteristics only qualitatively.  
In all runs, we see upward flow in the core of the aerobic zone with downward flow near 
the wall. Even at maximum wastewater flow rates from the top of the aerobic zone, the 
flow direction below the outlet to the microaerophillic zone is not affected. Flow in the 
microaerophillic zone is downward with some circulation at and above the height of the 
outlet from the aerobic zone. At the base of the microaerophillic zone, the flow separates. 
Part of the flow field from the microaerophillic zone is continuous with the flow field 
leading upwards into the aerobic zone past the sparger, and part disperses into large 
eddies in the conical anoxic zone. These eddies in turn appear to have a large impact on 
the flow pattern in the clarifier zone. 
The mean vertical velocity in the clarifier zone was calculated to be many orders of 
magnitude less than in the aerobic and microaerophillic zones. The flow is therefore 
easily perturbed by upstream activity, around the edges of the anoxic cone. Flow in the 
anoxic zone just below the clarifier is roughly radial and results from the broader pattern 
of eddies in that area. In Runs 1 to 20, 23 and 25, the 7-cm-wide clarifier is fully open to 
the perpendicular flow below. In these runs, the flow pattern in the clarifier demonstrates 
pronounced circulation. The geometry in Runs 21 and 22 is modified variously so as to 
partially shield the entrance to the clarifier from the shearing horizontal eddies in the 
anoxic zone. The resulting flow pattern is very steady, uniform upward flow. Ensuring 
this flow pattern in the clarifier is important from a treatment perspective in order to 
allow for easy settling of solids.  
Runs 13 to 18 varied the wastewater inflow rate in order to determine whether higher 
flows had a smoothing effect on the velocity field in the clarifier. Even at very high flow 
rates, however, the flow pattern in the clarifier exhibited significant circulation. 
Therefore, the only effective mechanism for inducing smooth upward flow in the clarifier 
was modification of skirt geometry so as to shield the flow within from the circulation in 
the cone below. 
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Figures 1.3 to 1.9 were generated with R in order to compare Runs 10 and 22, which 
differ only with respect to the geometry of the skirts around the base of the clarifier. 
Figures 1.3 and 1.4 plot z-direction velocities versus radial distance at three heights: 0.12, 
0.43 and 0.73 m above the sparger. Figure 1.3 corresponds to Run 10 (without clarifier 
isolation) and Figure 1.4 corresponds to Run 22 (with clarifier isolation). Because the 
model results for velocity values in the clarifier are too small to be reliably quantified, 
they are omitted from the figures. The velocity distributions in the aerobic (blue) and 
microaerophilic (red) zones are very similar.  
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 are set up in the same way as Figures 1.3 and 1.4, but the velocity 
data correspond to normalized vectors in the x- and y-directions. The velocity magnitudes 
in Figures 1.5 and 1.6 are therefore a two-dimensional projection of the three-
dimensional velocity vector onto the x-y axis. A value of 0 indicates that the three-
dimensional velocity vector points entirely in the z-direction (unless it too is 0). Because 
the principle of continuity dictates that the average direction of fluid motion is positive-z 
in the aerobic zone and negative-z in the microaerophilic zone, the magnitude (and range 
of magnitudes) of the x-y projection of the velocity vector indicates the circulation 
occurring at the point studied. Again, we see substantial similarity between Runs 10 and 
22. We also see that the greatest circulation in the aerobic zone occurs nearest to the 
sparger, and that the greatest circulation in the microaerophilic zone occurs nearest to the 
spout connecting the two zones. Circulation in the microaerophilic zone dissipates rapidly 
as fluid moves down. The spread of velocities observed at the wall between the 
microaerophilic zone and the clarifier is likely to be an artefact of the computational 
model.  
Finally, Figures 1.7a, 1.7b and 1.7c compare the probability distributions of the 
magnitude of the x-y projection of the velocity vector at different heights between Runs 
10 and 22. In this case, the figures are separated according to height above the sparger 
(0.12, 0.43 and 0.73 m) with Runs 10 and 22 compared on each.  The y-axis represents 
the probability density of each ‘bin’ of velocity ranges. Although the precision of the 
computational model was not adequate to reliably quantify the magnitudes of the velocity 
vectors in the clarifier, we observed that the overall flow pattern conformed to predictions 
about the impact of changing geometry and wastewater flow rate. To roughly represent 
the circulation observed in Run 10 (without clarifier isolation) and Run 22 (with clarifier 
isolation), we plot the distribution of the x-y projection of the velocity vector. Indeed, we 
see that the bulk of the distribution is significantly lower in Run 22 than in Run 10, 
particularly at a height of 0.43 m above the sparger (Figure 1.7b). The reduction of 
circulation is less significant at the bottom (Figure 1.7a) and the top (Figure 1.7c) of the 
clarifier, although this might be an artefact of the computational model. 
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Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show the flow pattern in the unprotected clarifier modelled in Run 10. 
Figures 1.10 and 1.11 show the flow pattern in the shielded clarifier modelled in Run 22. 
They are included in the supplementary information section.  
1.7 Conclusion 
This research has applied the methods of computational fluid dynamics to study the 
principle hydrodynamic characteristics of a new type of wastewater treatment system. 
The novelty of the technology studied lies primarily in the integration of an external 
clarifier zone, isolated from the air-driven flow in the aerobic and microaerophillic zones. 
This feature has led us to explore possible effects of wastewater flow rates, a dimension 
not studied in other works of this category. Model output was compared with 
experimental results to confirm its validity and then used to explore the effects of varying 
operating conditions and geometries on circulation time, mean vertical velocities and the 
qualitative characteristics of flow patterns.  
The model we developed produces results that compare well with experimental data over 
a range of operating conditions. The model suggests that the hydrodynamic 
characteristics are essentially independent of wastewater flow rate used, even in the 
clarifier zone where the wastewater throughput is responsible for the mean flow. Perhaps 
most importantly, the geometry of the reactor around the base of the clarifier has a direct 
effect on the smoothness of flow towards the exit and must be chosen so as to be 
conducive to the settling of solids.  
Hydrodynamic characteristics such as circulation and flow pattern which in this research 
have been described only qualitatively, and characteristics such as turbulence, which are 
not examined in this research, can be quantified in future study of the reactor 
configurations of interest. Primarily, the reactor configurations that suggest smooth rising 
in the clarifier should be explored in greater detail to model more quantitatively the 
hydrodynamic characteristics that might have an impact on the treatment potential of this 
technology: this research found that adjusting reactor geometry is far more likely to have 
an impact on flow pattern in the clarifier than modifying operating conditions. 
Although the body of literature on CFD modelling of air-lift bioreactors is relatively 
mature, this research is unique in its study of the hydrodynamics around the integrated 
clarifier zone. The primary contribution of this research is to provide guidance on the 
configuration of the skirt isolating the clarifier. This research also demonstrates that the 
conclusions drawn on the configuration of the clarifier geometry are independent of 
operating characteristics such as air flow and wastewater throughput rates. Therefore, 
these conclusions are very easily portable to other bioreactors that feature an integrated 
clarifier zone.  
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It would be possible to expand the model to consider a dispersed solid phase. This would 
be useful for modelling sedimentation and the behaviour of the solid phase itself. The 
momentum transfer to the solid phase would also have a small slowing effect on the 
circulating liquid phase. Results from the present study imply that inclusion of a solid 
phase would not have any bearing on the conclusions with respect to the importance of 
skirt geometry below the clarifier zone. This study already examined the effects of a 
variable wastewater throughput rate on the hydrodynamics of the clarifier zone and found 
them to be negligible compared to the effects of geometry. Because the dispersed solid 
phase would have an even smaller impact on the momentum exchange in and around the 
clarifier zone than the wastewater throughput rate, we can conclude that a dispersed solid 




A probabilistic decision-making framework for the management of sewage plumes in a 
tidal environment2 
The complex and unsteady hydrodynamics of coastal waters greatly complicates water 
quality assessment and prediction and hence impact valuation and decision-making. A 
rational analysis requires an understanding of underlying hydrodynamics, principles of 
water quality in unsteady environments, impact valuation methods and decision analysis 
techniques. Two-dimensional numerical models of sewage plumes in tidal environments 
illustrate the high sensitivity of water quality to input parameters such as density 
stratification and tidal condition that vary continuously with time. This chapter 
demonstrates the applicability of probabilistic methods in translating discrete snapshots 
of water quality under time-variable conditions into a description of water quality that 
can be used to evaluate the costs of ecological and economic impacts. In order to allow 
for comparison of management alternatives in terms of the net costs of each 
(infrastructure investment and the associated ecological and economic impacts), the 
quality/impact valuation model is nested in a decision analysis framework. The case 
study fleshed out starts with a numerical water quality model of Burrard Inlet near 
Vancouver, Canada. This model is a good example of the state of the art in environmental 
fluid mechanics and combines and describes water quality under multiple discrete 
combinations of input conditions. 
2.1 Introduction 
The complex physical processes at play in coastal waters make them among the most 
economically and socially valuable habitats on Earth, a fact long since recognized by 
humans; over 60% of the world’s population is settled on lands adjoining estuaries 
(Wolanski 2007). The fruitful physical complexities and high population density of 
estuarine environments have two corollaries especially relevant for engineers and policy-
makers: these waters bear the brunt of anthropogenic environmental impacts, and, as 
importantly, these impacts are extremely difficult to model and therefore manage. 
This chapter constructs a decision model for the management of sewage discharges to 
tidal waters that integrates computational fluid dynamics (CFD) model output with 
probabilistic and impact valuation analysis. This framework has the potential to 
substantially improve water quality management and decision-making strategies by 
making better use of CFD models.  
                                                 
2 This research was presented at the Society for Risk Analysis 2012 annual conference in Charleston, South 
Carolina. It won the Ecological Risk Assessment Student Merit Award.  
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The example presented here is based on the case study of Burrard Inlet, near Vancouver, 
Canada, where sewage behaviour was studied in a CFD model by Li & Hodgins (2010). 
Their research models the sewage plume in the receiving waters under a number of 
discrete combinations of input conditions. The example fleshed out in this work is an 
infrastructure decision, where managers must weigh the environmental impacts of 
sewage discharges, the frequency of impacts, the cost of their occurrence and the cost of 
their abatement for several alternative courses of action. A conceptual overview of the 
model is included in Figure 2.1. Our task is therefore to demonstrate how probabilistic 
risk assessment and impact valuation methods can be applied to 1) resolve the CFD 
model of discrete conditions into an average index of water quality and 2) use the water 
quality measure obtained for different CFD simulations to inform environmental 
management decision-making. Specifically, this case study supposes two hypothetical 
policy alternatives: 1) do nothing and 2) complete risk abatement. In the do-nothing 
alternative, the risk model is applied to water quality data that reflects the status quo. 
Cost of impacts is a function of a valuation model and cost of investment is zero. 
Likewise, the cost of impacts in the complete risk abatement alternative is zero and cost 
of investment is some dollar value. In fact, we do not define this dollar value a priori, but 
rather consider that it must be at most equal to the cost of the risk from the do-nothing 
alternative; the risk cost from the do-nothing alternative is logically equal to the highest 
cost warranted for complete risk abatement.  
2.2 Background 
Discharge to receiving waters of untreated or partially treated sewage is a relatively 
common feature of the Canadian landscape of wastewater management, even in densely 
populated parts of the country (Natural Resources Canada 2004). Water quality problems 
appear when the loading exceeds the assimilative capacity of the receiving waters and 
can manifest themselves as surfacing, settling or washing ashore of parts of a sewage 
plume, adversely affecting the recreational or economic value of aquatic or coastal 
environments. The ability to model and therefore predict such water quality problems 
allows for a timely and well-informed engineering or policy response and is therefore of 
great interest to actors in environment and public infrastructure. 
Hydrodynamic models have recently been developed to plot sewage plumes in tidal 
environments and illustrate the high sensitivity of the plume shape and dilution to time-
variable input parameters. Wastewater loading, tidal condition and seasonal stratification 
vary continuously with time and different combinations of assumptions produce 
dramatically different results. The Li & Hodgins model of Burrard inlet, which we use to 
develop a case study of our decision-making framework, provides 12 two-dimensional 
plume profiles that represent each combination of representative assumptions for 
wastewater loading (present-day dry weather, present-day wet weather), tidal condition 
(ebb, flood, slack) and seasonal stratification (summer, winter). While this hydrodynamic 
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modelling approach provides valuable insight into the spatial distribution of sewage 
plumes and its dependence on time-variable input conditions, a complete water quality 
assessment can only be made with an understanding of the frequency/probability of each 
of the 12 ‘representative’ plumes and of the interaction between the different plumes and 
the environment to produce quantifiable impacts. 
The advanced modelling effort required to characterize water quality in tidal waters and 
the probabilistic nature of water quality model output present significant barriers to 
rational public policy decisions in matters of wastewater treatment and water 
management planning. Decision-making must be guided by a synthetic water-
quality/economic-valuation model that identifies potential impacts, calculates the 
probability of their occurrence and quantifies the cost of occurrence as compared to the 
costs of various policy responses. 
Beyond the essentially deterministic input parameters studied for example by Li & 
Hodgins lie additional challenges posed by stochastic phenomena such as wind shear, 
non-tidal transport waves, turbulent mixing and dispersion. This research organizes the 
deterministic Li & Hodgins CFD model into a probabilistic framework and does not 
directly treat stochastic parameters.  
The study by Li & Hodgins integrates near- and far- field CFD models, with near-field 
being used in the vicinity of the sewage outfall and far-field being used farther upstream 
and downstream. The near-field model is based on the line-buoyant plume model UM, 
developed by US EPA. The far-field model uses large eddy simulation (LES). The two 
models are integrated so as to eliminate discontinuities at the boundary. Model output 
results were found to be particularly sensitive to density stratification, sewage discharge 
rate (a function of weather) and the directionality of ambient flow. Model results were 
therefore evaluated over each combination of representative values for each significant 
parameter.  
2.3 Risk model for water quality 
Current CFD models express water quality and sewage behaviour under discrete 
combinations of inputs that describe receiving water conditions and sewage loading. Our 
first task is to understand how the discrete, representative model outputs combine to 
describe water quality on average. We apply concepts from probabilistic risk assessment 
to organize the discrete snapshots of water quality according to their 
probability/frequency. Once this is complete, an impact valuation model can be applied in 
order to produce information usable for decision-making.  
2.3.1 Event tree for as-is scenario 
We illustrate the development of an event tree by constructing one for the Li & Hodgins 
model of Burrard Inlet. The model was run for 12 discrete cases: one for each 
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combination of assumptions for water stratification (summer or winter), tidal motion 
(ebb, flood or slack) and sewage loading rate (1 or 3 m3/s for dry and wet weather 
respectively). These profiles output two-dimensional dilution curves and are designed to 
represent plume dilutions as a function of geometry under the spectrum of physical 
conditions in the tidal water. They ultimately aim to evaluate under what conditions 
sewage plumes exhibit undesired behaviour, the most relevant characteristics being 
surfacing, settling and far longitudinal transport of undiluted sewage.  
Considering the variables to be independent, we can calculate marginal probabilities from 
average weather and tidal data (Environment Canada 2010; Fisheries & Oceans Canada 
2011). 
Variable 1: Seasonal stratification 
p(season = summer) = 0.5 
p(season = winter) = 0.5 
Variable 2: Tidal variation 
p(tides = ebb) = 0.67 
p(tides = slack) = 0.04 
p(tides = flood) = 0.29 
Variable 3: Dry weather/wet weather flow rate 
p(weather = dry) = 0.55 
p(weather = wet) = 0.45 
Figure 2.2 organizes the 12 cases from Li & Hodgins according to variables in their 
model input and the real probabilities we assign each of them. Note that the 
summer/winter and ebb/slack/flood variables have a direct physical bearing on the water 
quality model attributable to receiving water stratification and tidal motion, respectively. 
Dry and wet weather represent differences in sewage loading rate: 1 m3/s in dry weather 
and 3 m3/s in wet weather. Sewage loading rate is the underlying parameter that is used 
as input in the water quality model. The probability of each loading rate is therefore 
decided by historical weather data.  
2.3.2 Impact valuation model 
Surfacing, settling, washing ashore and longitudinal transport of undiluted sewage have 
diverse impacts on the ecological, economic and aesthetic value of receiving waters. 
Impact quantification is highly site-specific, and conducting this kind of analysis for our 
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case study of Burrard Inlet is beyond our scope. A review of the literature did not 
uncover any methods for translating time-variable water quality into an average index 
that could be useable for water quality forecasting, impact valuation and decision-
making. Rather, site-specific studies have tended to be undertaken in order to understand 
impacts retrospectively. This may be because there has so far been no framework for 
improved decision-making on the basis of more sophisticated valuation models. This 
represents a significant barrier to developing a decision model for tidal waters. The 
present research may however provide a basis for further research in that direction. 
To move forward in our framework, we consider a simplified, temporary impact 
valuation method based on several simplifying assumptions: 
1. Environmental and economic receptors are adversely affected by a sewage plume 
that surfaces, settles or is transported far downstream. Sewage that rapidly mixes, 
dilutes and washes to sea has no impact. 
2. Environmental and economic impacts are measured by changes in recreational 
and fishing value of the water and changes in property values of land adjoining 
the water. 
3. Fishing value of the water is negatively impacted by surfacing, settling and far 
longitudinal transport of undiluted sewage; tourism and recreational value of the 
water and property values of adjoining land are negatively impacted only by 
surfacing of undiluted sewage.  
4. Undiluted is considered to mean at least as concentrated as one part in one 
hundred thousand (10-5). Concentrations equal to or greater than 10-5 affect 
receptors equally, and concentrations smaller than this have no impact.  
5. The value of the impact is proportional to its probability/frequency, regardless of 
the timing. A receptor has zero value when it is impacted according to the 
foregoing assumptions and full value otherwise. 
6. Property values on the land adjoining the water are only partially a function of the 
water quality. It is assumed that degraded water quality can impact property 
values to a maximum of 10%.  
In addition to allowing us to move forward with constructing a decision-making 
framework, this simplified impact model demonstrates the questions that a realistic 
valuation model would need to address in order to implement this tool.  
With respect to the environmental and economic valuations addressed in points 1 and 2, 
this framework depends on the use of tools that translate degraded water quality into 
economic impacts and also on tools that translate plume behaviour into the specific 
phenomena that are responsible for degraded water quality. Eutrophication and algal 
bloom are significant biochemical processes that degrade water quality and are 
responsible for decreased recreational and economic value. Impacts of these phenomena 
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are relatively well referenced in the context of steady-state water systems (e.g. Anderson 
et al. 2000; Hoagland et al. 2002). Likewise, models relating nutrient and phosphorus 
content of receiving waters to resulting eutrophication and proliferation of algae (Chapra 
1996). However, in order for the framework established in this chapter to move forward, 
analogues to these models will need to be established in the context of transient water 
bodies. 
2.3.3 Sample model output 
The CFD output by Li & Hodgins was combined with the risk and provisional valuation 
model described above to flesh out the decision-making framework. The results are 
tabulated in Table 2.1.  
The several binary simplifications described in the preceding section allow for the value 
of each receptor to be proportionally reduced according to the probability/frequency of 
receiving water behaviour that impacts it. This therefore assumes knowledge of the 
maximum potential value of each receptor in the absence of receiving water 
contamination.  
The risk and provisional valuation model calculates an 85% reduction in the value of 
fishing activities, a 57% reduction in the recreational use value and a 6% reduction in 
property values of the land nearby. With data on the best-case value of the receptors, 
these results would facilitate a rational decision as to the maximum risk investment is 
warranted in risk abatement. 
Although the provisional valuation model has made several simplifying assumptions, it 
has brought us closer to accounting for costs of impacts in a highly transient water body. 
Indeed, we can see from Table 2.1 that the worst-case results (CFD runs 5, 7, 10-14 and 
17) account for only about 57% of expected outcomes, meaning that a large proportion 
(43%) of an annual period of analysis would present light or no impacts. It is likely worth 
refining the valuation model in order to take proper account of this impact-free time to 
avoid overestimating the value of impacts as would do a valuation model based on the 
worst case scenario.   
2.4 Chance and future predictions 
So far, we have described the process of assessing and valuing impacts of an existing 
scenario with known input conditions and no element of chance.  Recall that the 
rightmost leaves on Figure 2.2 associated with the probability of dry and wet weather are 
the determinants of sewage loading rates (1 and 3 m3/s, respectively). These sewage 
loading rates are used as input in the CFD models, and plume profiles are generated. The 
probabilities associated with these discharge rates are thus just the frequencies of dry and 
wet weather; the discharge rates are known for each of them.  
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Because infrastructure decisions made now must consider forecasted conditions, current 
loading rates are not enough to produce a completely meaningful decision model. Future 
loading rates, which do have an element of chance, are needed. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
expansion of the decision model to handle probabilistic predictions of future contaminant 
plumes, zoomed in on the summer/ebb branch. The probabilities of ‘dry weather’ and 
‘wet weather’ branches would remain as they are currently, but they would no longer 
directly determine the wastewater discharge rate used in the CFD model. Instead, 
predictions 1 to 3 (or more) would be estimates of future discharge rate, as calculated 
based on population predictions, future infrastructure loading, or other indicators. After 
running the CFD model under these hypothetical model conditions and applying the 
valuation model, traditional risk analysis techniques can be used to inform decision-
making.  
In the previous section, we reviewed the complexities of water quality modelling in 
estuarine environments. Beyond the wide variation in deterministic parameters that have 
significant impact on the model output, there are other influences that require 
probabilistic treatment in the water quality model themselves. What we have seen so far 
has been probabilistic treatment of divergent deterministic water quality predictions. 
Additionally, refined water quality models that are themselves probabilistic expressions 
can be resolved into the decision-making framework if the CFD models themselves are 
enhanced. The CFD models nested in the decision-model would need to run themselves 
under different input conditions and identify and store those results that are relevant to 
decision-making. Using our sample valuation model, the enhanced CFD code should 
count simulations whose match certain criteria: 1) surfacing, 2) settling and 3) far 
transport. The probability of different impacts for different assumptions can thus be 
calculated as a part of the water quality model based on the number of simulations out of 
the total number that resulted in impacts as we are defining them. This approach can be 
considered as nesting CFD within a Monte Carlo simulation. Alternatively, we could 
adapt the CFD model to accommodate stochastic parameters internally. Lin et al. claim 
that such an internally stochastic CFD model is more than an order of magnitude more 
computationally intensive than its deterministic equivalent (2007). Because our CFD 
models have several locations of interest (surface, bottom, etc.), they might be 
considerably more intensive than this. We would however expect that the alternative of 
nesting a deterministic CFD model within a Monte Carlo simulation would represent 
much more than ten times the effort required to model the same deterministic simulation 
once. Therefore, if the CFD model can be easily adapted to accommodate stochastic 





The role of detection limits in drinking water regulation3 
Some commentators on environmental science and policy have claimed that advances in 
analytical chemistry, reflected by an ability to detect contaminants at ever-decreasing 
concentrations, lead to regulations stricter than justified by available toxicological data. 
We evaluate this claim in the context of drinking water regulation, with respect to 
contaminants regulated under the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA). We examine the 
relationships between historical and present maximum contaminant levels and goals in 
the greater context of detection capability and evaluate the extent to which different 
aspects of the regulatory apparatus (i.e., analytical capability, cost-benefit analysis, 
analysis of competing risks, and available toxicological data) influence the regulatory 
process. Our findings do not support the claim that decreases in detection limit lead to 
more stringent regulation in the context of drinking water regulation in the United States. 
Further, based on our analysis of the National Primary Drinking Water Regulation and 
existing United States Environmental Protection Agency approaches to establishing the 
practical quantifiable level, we conclude that in the absence of changes to the underlying 
toxicological model, regulatory revision is unlikely. 
3.1 Introduction 
Relevant toxicological models are generally understood to be the dominant influence on 
environmental exposure standards, including drinking water quality criteria. However, 
minimum detection capability serves as the lower limit below which regulation is not 
possible. In this way, ability to regulate is dependent on ability to detect, and advances in 
analytical chemistry allow for more stringent regulations. 
We evaluate the vanishing zero claim with respect to drinking water regulation through 
the following steps: 
1. Establishing a reregulation mechanism: We outline a regulatory mechanism based 
on the relationships between analytical capability, toxicological models, and cost 
benefit analysis and delineate the mechanism by which increased detection ability 
would bring about more stringent regulations; 
2. Grouping currently regulated contaminants: We organize a subset of relevant 
contaminants, as outlined by the mechanism established in ref 1, according to 
relationships between final regulations, analytical capability, and toxicological 
                                                 
3 This chapter is the basis for a journal paper with the same title co-authored by Ketra Schmitt, published in 
Environmental Science & Technology, Vol. 44 (21), 2010.  
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goals to identify which regulated contaminants are theoretically most susceptible 
to reregulation on the basis of improved detection ability; 
3. Assessment of the significance of detection capability in reregulation mechanism: 
We describe the ongoing regulation and reregulation assessment process at US 
EPA and evaluate the extent to which improved detection ability is influencing 
the regulatory apparatus, in terms of the delineated contaminant groups and 
mechanisms; 
4. Review of real past regulatory changes: We document previous regulatory 
revisions against a timeline of analytical capability and establish the role 
analytical advances have historically played in triggering regulatory revisions; and 
5. Significance of detection capability in emerging contaminants: We examine the 
process by which US EPA identifies new regulatory opportunities and assess the 
limitations imposed by, and overall significance of, detection ability.  
To our knowledge, this study is the only policy analysis to date focusing on the 
mechanism by which changes are made in contaminant regulation, or the significance of 
analytical advances in triggering reregulation, targeted at a speciﬁc regulatory apparatus. 
This study considers drinking water regulation only in the United States, the only country 
whose regulatory apparatus our research has found to be the subject of documented 
claims of ‘the vanishing zero effect’ or ‘detection limit creep’. Indeed, a comparison of 
drinking water standards for 67 chemical contaminants promulgated variously by the US 
EPA, the World Health Organization, and the governments of Australia and Canada show 
that there is much room for drinking water standards in the U.S. to ‘creep’ downward: 
only 28 of the 67 contaminants targeted by this international comparison are currently 
regulated by the US EPA, and of these 28 contaminants, the standard enforced by the US 
EPA is greater than the smallest value in the comparison by at least 1 order of magnitude 
for 15 of them (Boyd 2006). Augmenting the findings of this study with the remaining 
contaminants whose regulations are currently limited in the U.S. by detection ability (a 
total of 24), we find that nine of them are greater by at least an order of magnitude than 
the guideline value of at least one other country in the comparison. 
3.2 Background 
The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) empowers US EPA to regulate drinking water 
quality in the context of cost-benefit analysis and available treatment technology and 
toxicological data (AWWA 1999). It should be noted that the role of cost-benefit analysis 
in the many statutes administered by US EPA is not uniform: economic analysis 
weighing benefits against cost-related factors is specifically limited for a number of 
statutes under US EPA’s jurisdiction (Morgenstern 1994). In contrast, the standards US 
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EPA sets within the framework of the SDWA are the result of economic analysis that 
balances cost of compliance and expected benefits in the greater context of analytical and 
treatment feasibility (AWWA 1999). 
The National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR) are the end results of 
toxicological, technical, and economic assessment and constitute the list of legally 
enforceable standards promulgated under the SDWA. The NPDWR target a total of 84 
water contaminants as well as three indicators. Since 1998, US EPA has published 
contaminant candidate lists (CCL) every five years to track potential targets for 
regulation under NPDWR (US EPA 2009b). From the CCLs, US EPA is required to 
make a regulatory determination on five contaminants every five years, on the basis of 
the danger posed by different chemical contaminants, the frequency and extent of their 
occurrence in public water systems, and the potential of a regulation to protect public 
health (NRC 1999).  
US EPA relies on two parameters to communicate the recognized detection capabilities 
for each of the contaminants it regulates: the method detection limit (MDL) and the 
practical quantification limit (PQL). For a thorough discussion of the operational 
definitions of each of these parameters, the reader is referred to Gibbons’s analysis 
(1994). However, we summarize MDL as the lowest concentration at which the presence 
of a given analyte can be confirmed (differentiated from a zero concentration) with a 
given analytical method to 99% certainty and the PQL as the lowest concentration of an 
analyte that can be reliably measured and differentiated from other, nonzero 
concentrations. The PQL can be determined in two ways. First, by real laboratory 
performance, where data are available, the PQL corresponds to the lowest concentration 
accurately measured by 75% of US EPA regional and state laboratories (US EPA 2006). 
Alternatively, the PQL can be calculated by multiplying the MDL by 5 or 10, according 
to the uncertainty or level of conservativeness required (US EPA 2006); whereas the 
MDL is determined experimentally and is specific to the operator and instrument at the 
time of analysis, the PQL is calculated by US EPA as a measure of typical expected lab 
performance (Eaton et al. 1998). US EPA therefore considers the PQL, rather than the 
MDL, the lowest level to which it is technically feasible to regulate. US EPA specifies 
the MDL required of tests performed on drinking water contaminants (CFR title 40) but 
uses the PQL as a measure of regulatory feasibility. Hamilton et al. (2003) compare 
drinking water standards to the MDL data, but not to PQL data, as a comment on the role 
of analytical capability in pesticide regulation.  
The third quantity of interest for this analysis is the maximum contaminant level goals 
(MCLG). MCLGs are the concentrations of contaminants in drinking water that are not 
expected to have an adverse effect on human health (AWWA 1999). US EPA sets MCLG 
values based on the available evidence of carcinogenicity, according to weight of 
evidence categories (US EPA 2009c). For known or probable human carcinogens, the 
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MCLG is zero, because US EPA considers that no dose of carcinogenic contaminants 
will present zero risk, unless there is specific evidence to the contrary for a given 
contaminant (US EPA 1998). The fourth quantity of interest is the maximum contaminant 
level (MCL), which is the numerical value of the regulation US EPA sets for drinking 
water contaminants. The MCL must be set as close to the MCLG as feasible, taking into 
account cost and technical factors.  
A 1996 amendment to the SDWA requires US EPA to review existing NPDWR and 
make revisions, where appropriate (US EPA 2003m). An integral part of this process is 
an analytical feasibility review to identify where US EPA is technically able to revise the 
PQL and, in some cases, the MCL. Reviews conducted in 2003 and 2009 assessed all but 
three chemical contaminants on the NPDWR in terms of the feasibility of lowering their 
PQL. The 2003 review did not target all the contaminants on the NPDWR but rather two 
subsets: 1) those whose MCL is limited by analytical feasibility (MCLG < PQL ) MCL) 
and 2) those contaminants considered by US EPA as being likely or possible targets of 
toxicological review determining the appropriateness of lowering the MCLG (another 
component of the six-year review). The 2003 review targeted a total of 40 chemical 
contaminants, including 22 of the 24 contaminants where MCLG < PQL ) MCL, and 18 
contaminants regulated less stringently than technically possible but that were likely to 
undergo a toxicological review of the MCLG. The 2009 review re-examined all but one 
of these 40 contaminants along with 27 others, including the two remaining contaminants 
where MCLG < PQL ) MCL. The 2003 Review targeted almost all of the contaminants 
of immediate relevance to our analysis and presented more detailed information on 
improvements in analytical sensitivity and so is more relevant to our study than the 2009 
Review. 
3.2 Findings 
3.2.1 Establishing a mechanism 
We inferred the limiting effect of different parts of the regulatory apparatus by organizing 
contaminants listed in the NPDWR according to the relationships between the public 
health goal (MCLG), regulation (MCL), and detection capability (PQL), as illustrated in 
Figure 3.1. Figure 3.1 shows the two main possible cases: either the regulation equals the 
public health goal (Relationship 1) or the regulation is less protective than the public 
health goal. A regulation can be less protective than the public health goal where it is 
limited by detection ability (Relationship 2) or where limited by cost-benefit analysis at 
some point above detection capability (Relationship 3). 
If the regulation is fully protective of public health (Relationship 1), it is only likely to be 
revised if there is a change to the underlying toxicological model, not as a result of 
increased detection ability, because no public health motivation exists for a stricter 
regulation. If limited by cost-benefit analysis (Relationship 3), improved detection ability 
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reflected by a lowered PQL would not be immediately relevant. US EPA would already 
have decided that it is not economically feasible to regulate to the level technically 
possible. If, however, the regulation is limited by analytical capability (Relationship 2), a 
change to the PQL could precipitate a change to the regulation promulgated by US EPA. 
Therefore, Relationship 2 is the most relevant to our analysis as it includes the 
contaminants susceptible to reregulation as a result of improved detection capability. 
Ferguson et al. (2007) identified all regulated drinking water contaminants where MCLG 
< PQL, including arsenic, the subject of their study. They used the observation that 
MCLG < PQL to conclude that lowered detection ability may facilitate a lowered MCL. 
However, the authors did not comment on the relationship between the PQL and the 
MCL itself: the current PQL for arsenic is lower than the MCL, meaning that the 
regulation is limited not by technical feasibility but by cost-benefit analysis. While the 
PQL may stand to be lowered, we cannot conclude that it is likely to have an impact on 
the regulation set by US EPA (US EPA 2003m). Indeed, US EPA stated specifically that 
the arsenic rule protects public health to the extent that the benefits justify the costs (US 
EPA 2001a). 
Recall that US EPA’s study evaluated the technical feasibility of lowering regulations for 
1) those contaminants currently regulated to the limit of detection (MCL ) PQL, 
Relationship 2) and 2) where a possible revision to the toxicological model might change 
the MCLG, hence perhaps the MCL. While advances in analytical capability could 
facilitate a lower MCL (more stringent regulation) for either group, these advances can 
actively influence a change in MCL only where detection capabilities are the dominant 
factor (Relationship 2). We previously identified Relationship 2 contaminants to be the 
most sensitive to reregulation on the basis of improved detection capabilities. Assuming 
that such reregulation occurs, the resulting relationship between the new regulation 
(MCL’), the new detection limit (PQL’), and the public health goal (MCLG) would imply 
reclassification of the contaminant under Relationship 2, or 3, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
The new MCL (MCL’) could be set equal to the new PQL (PQL’) if it is economical to 
do so (Relationship 2 remains). If US EPA decides it is not economical to regulate to this 
level, whether PQL’ is higher or lower than the public health goal (MCLG), MCL’ would 
only be regulated to that cost-effective level (Relationship 3 takes over). If PQL’ is lower 
than or equal to the public health goal and it is economical to regulate to that level, MCL’ 
will only be set as low as the public health goal, as there would be no toxicological need 
to regulate to a lower level (Relationship 1 takes over).  
We should note that many of the contaminants currently classified under Relationship 2 
are carcinogenic compounds, with an MCLG ≠ 0. For these contaminants, it would not be 
possible for Relationship 1 to take over, since it is impossible to detect and therefore 
regulate to zero. 
 39 
For all contaminants, detection capability (PQL), cost-benefit analysis, and toxicological 
knowledge (MCLG) all represent some value below which the MCL will not be set. 
Figure 3.3 maps two conceptions of how drinking water regulations (MCL) change in 
response to improved detection capability (lower PQL) for contaminants whose 
regulatory levels are constrained by detection capability (Relationship 2). The blue line 
illustrates the mechanism we have outlined, whereby the MCL may be revised to follow 
the PQL until it reaches the strictest MCL justified by cost-benefit analysis, which we 
have represented in the figure as MCLCB (Relationship 3 takes over), or until it reaches 
the public health goal (MCLG) beyond which there would be no need to regulate 
(Relationship 1 takes over). This contrasts with the red line that represents unconstrained 
regulation along with the detection capabilities at levels closer and closer to zero as might 
be suggested by the ‘vanishing zero’ effect. Depending on the contaminant, MCLCB may 
be greater, less than, or equal to the MCLG (the variable relationship between MCLCB 
and MCLG is represented in Figure 3.3a,b by double-headed arrows). For most 
carcinogenic contaminants, the MCLG is equal to zero (in the absence of evidence that 
indicates the existence of a safe nonzero concentration). For contaminants that are the 
subject of competing risk analysis, such as between risk of illness from waterborne 
pathogens and cancer risk from disinfection by-products, the MCL is calculated in 
consideration of these competing risks. 
Figure 3.3b reproduces the graph of the mechanism we outlined above, identifying where 
Relationships 1, 2, and 3 fit in. For a given contaminant, the MCLCB may be greater or 
lower than the MCLG. If MCLCB > MCLG, as depicted in Figure 3.3a,b, we would 
expect cost-benefit analysis to limit further regulation (Relationship 3 takes over) before 
the public health goal. If that relationship is reversed (MCLG > MCLCB), as indicated by 
the hashed arrows, then we would expect the public health goal to limit further regulation 
(Relationship1 takes over) before cost-benefit analysis. 
3.2.2 Grouping currently regulated contaminants 
In the 2003 and 2009 analytical feasibility reviews, US EPA identified a total of 24 
contaminants where the MCL is currently tied to the PQL, representing a regulatory 
mechanism that directly connects detection capability with drinking water standard (11, 
12). Generally speaking, these are the known or probable human carcinogens to which 
US EPA considers there to be no safe exposure. According to the regulatory mechanism 
outlined above, the MCLs of these 24 are not limited by cost-benefit analysis but by 
current detection abilities. This is also the case for two contaminants to which US EPA 
does consider there to be a safe nonzero exposure, that is, for which MCLG ≠ 0 (thallium 
and 1,1,2-trichloroethane). The remaining contaminants regulated to a value higher (less 
stringent) than the value possible with current analytical methods are regulated to the 
limit deemed necessary by available toxicological data. Thus, improvements in detection 
 40 
ability (decreases in PQL) would not necessarily lead to more stringent regulation. 
Rather, cost-benefit analysis could then prevent further strengthening of the regulation. A 
similar mechanism could facilitate the reregulation to a higher (less stringent) level of 
contaminants currently regulated to their MCLG if found not to be accurately represented 
by a linear dose-response profile (i.e., whose MCLG is re-evaluated above the PQL as the 
result of a toxicological or health review). 
However, for contaminants where the MCL is currently tied to the PQL and for which 
improved detection capability facilitates a lower PQL, there is room for reregulation on 
the basis of improved analytical methods. 
3.2.3 Assessment of the significance of detection capability in re-regulation 
mechanism 
Since the 2003 analytical feasibility review aimed to determine whether data on 
laboratory performance can be used to reassess the PQL of different contaminants (hence 
creating the possibility of a reassessment of the MCL), we assessed correlation between 
an overall improvement of detection capabilities and a call to reassess the PQL for two 
subgroups of contaminants: MCLG < PQL ≠ MCL (Relationship 2) and PQL < MCL, 
where the MCLG might be subject to revision (a subset of Relationships 1 or 3) (US EPA 
2003m). Therefore, US EPA assessed the practical feasibility of lowering the PQL of a 
large group of contaminants, some of which are classified under Relationship 2. Recall 
that this is the group for which the PQL is most relevant, and for which a revised PQL 
could logically lead to a revised MCL if cost-benefit analysis does not stop this from 
happening. The 2009 analytical feasibility review examined the same contaminants, plus 
two more whose regulation is contingent on detection ability (Relationship 2), and most 
of the remaining chemical contaminants not likely to undergo an MCLG revision and 
therefore not targeted by the 2003 review. 
We organized the 67 chemical contaminants targeted by the 2003 and 2009 analytical 
feasibility reviews according to the relationship between overall improvement in the 
sensitivity of methods since promulgation and the conclusion that a PQL re-evaluation is 
in order (11, 12). This categorization was facilitated for contaminants targeted by the 
2003 review by the detailed information available on the improvement of analytical 
methods since time of promulgation. For the 27 contaminants targeted by the 2009 
review and not targeted by the 2003 review, only improvements in analytical sensitivity 
having occurred between 2000 and 2007 were considered in the supporting 
documentation. It was therefore not possible to perform a parallel classification for these 
contaminants. Readers interested in the classification of each contaminant are referred to 
Table 3.1. For the 40 contaminants targeted by the 2003 review, we compared the 
distribution of conclusions as to the appropriateness of a PQL readjustment between two 
main groups of contaminants: those whose regulations are currently limited by detection 
 41 
capability (Relationship 2) and those currently limited by toxicological model or cost-
benefit analysis (Relationships 1 or 3). For each of these two groups, we consider the four 
permutations of two yes/no possibilities whether there has been an overall improvement 
in detection abilities since promulgation by US EPA, and whether US EPA concluded 
that a PQL reassessment may be appropriate. The distribution of contaminants within 
these four cases for the different Relationships will be discussed below. With these two 
groups and four cases, we can assess the correlation between advances in analytical 
capabilities and the PQL reassessment conclusion both for the group whose MCLs were 
identified as potentially susceptible to the influence of improved detection abilities 
(Relationship 2) and the group whose MCLs should be a function only of MCLG and 
cost benefit analysis (Relationship 1 or 3, respectively). Contaminants targeted by the 
2003 analytical feasibility study are about evenly distributed between Relationship 2 
(total of 22) and Relationships 1 or 3 (total of 18). Also, the distribution of contaminants 
among the four cases is roughly equal between Relationships 2 and Relationships 1 or 3. 
For both groups of contaminants, US EPA’s conclusion that a PQL re-evaluation is likely 
necessary was more common for those contaminants where no real improvement in 
sensitivity had occurred since promulgation: for Relationship 2 (MCL controlled by 
PQL), 15 contaminants were identified as candidates for a PQL revision. Out of these, 12 
had had no overall improvement in the sensitivity of methods, while only three had had 
such an improvement. Similarly, 10 contaminants in the Relationship 1 or 3 group were 
identified as PQL re-evaluation candidates, with 8 having seen no improvement in 
detection capabilities. Examining specifically those contaminants having seen an 
improvement in detection ability, we see that for Relationship 2, three were identified as 
PQL re-evaluation candidates, and two were not. Similarly, under Relationship 1 or 3, 
two contaminants having seen improvements in detection abilities were identified as PQL 
re-evaluation candidates and two were not. Improvement in detection capability is 
therefore not a useful indicator for predictions of PQL reassessment. An identical 
analysis based on the 2009 review was limited by the fact that only information on 
improvements in analytical sensitivity between 2000 and 2007 was available. For these 
contaminants, we also found that improvement in detection ability was not a useful 
indicator for predictions of PQL reassessment, but our sample of contaminants having 
undergone improvements in analytical ability was likely underrepresented. These 
comparisons are tabulated in Table 3.2. 
US EPA identified a reason why it has so far been unsuccessful at establishing lower 
PQLs for contaminants targeted by the Six-Year Reviews (2003, 2009). US EPA 
determines the PQL by sending samples spiked with different concentrations of different 
contaminants to real laboratories and plotting the percentage of laboratories ‘passing’ vs. 
concentration tested. Laboratories that pass are those that accurately quantify the spike 
sample within specified acceptance limits. US EPA defines PQL as the concentration at 
which 75% of laboratories successfully detect the concentration in the spike sample. US 
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EPA refers to these as its ‘Water Studies’. Where laboratory performance testing yielded 
consistently high results, determining the concentration at which 75% of laboratories 
would pass was not possible, limiting US EPA’s ability to make an assessment of what 
might be a more accurate PQL. The analytical feasibility support document relied on real 
laboratory performance data to evaluate the possibility of revising the PQL for different 
contaminants. In several instances, the water studies tested the detection capabilities of 
laboratories at concentrations higher than the concentrations of interest and thus were of 
limited use. This could represent a significant practical barrier to the mechanism 
connecting advances in detection capabilities with PQL revisions. If the Water Study data 
US EPA used to reassess PQLs reflected performance at concentrations closer to the real 
detection limits, there may have been greater basis for PQL re-evaluation. 
We note that US EPA has, for most contaminants, approved several analytical methods 
with detection limits that differ a great deal: up to several orders of magnitude in some 
cases. The use of analytical methods with higher detection limits would seem to short-
circuit the process by which PQLs are re-evaluated: laboratory performance is not as 
good as is technically possible in accurately measuring low concentrations of different 
contaminants. However, the fact that Water Studies systematically test laboratory 
performance at concentrations higher than current PQL pre-empts the relevance of the 
problem of unnecessarily high detection limits. Until the Water Studies accumulate 
performance data at lower concentrations of drinking water contaminants, there is no 
basis to say that too-high detection limits in US EPA laboratories are impeding any 
necessary adjustments to contaminant PQLs. 
3.2.4 Significance of detection ability to emerging contaminants 
We compiled the previous regulatory revisions made to the NPDWR and assessed the 
role of detection capability in facilitating or precipitating the change for each regulatory 
revision. A total of 15 drinking water standards have been revised since they were first 
promulgated by US EPA or its predecessors (US EPA 2001b). Out of these, six have 
been lowered while seven have been raised. Additionally, the nickel regulation was 
remanded, and the lead regulation was changed from an MCL to a required treatment 
technique4 (in addition to other requirements of the broader Lead and Copper Rule). Out 
of the 15 contaminants whose numerical standards were changed (including consideration 
of standards that predate the SDWA), seven have actually increased (become less 
stringent) since originally promulgated, while one other has been remanded. The arsenic 
standard was lowered, not to the PQL, but rather, to the MCLCB, as discussed earlier; 
this is also the case for cadmium, methoxychlor, and 2,4-D. The MCL for lead was 
                                                 
4 If the 90th percentile result of lead test results exceeds the action level of 0.015 mg/L, then additional 
monitoring, corrosion control treatment, source water monitoring/treatment, public education and/or lead 
service line replacement will be required based on system size and type. 
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replaced with a required treatment technique. Available data on historical detection 
capabilities for these 12 contaminants suggest that regulation to a lower value is possible 
but that incomplete toxicological data or economic realities have resulted in a higher 
value. For the remaining two (lindane and toxaphene), a thorough search through 
regulatory support documents identified no evidence explicitly tying the changes to 
advances in detection capabilities, although we notice that their MCLs are both equal to 
their PQLs. Table 3.3, in the Supporting Information, presents a summary of previous 
regulatory revisions with comments on historical detection capabilities. 
3.2.5 Review of real past regulatory changes 
Turning our attention from revisions to existing standards, we can examine the role 
detection ability plays in the implementation of new regulations.  
US EPA uses frequency of detections and concentrations detected to make a judgment on 
whether regulation would protect public health for regulatory determinations (US EPA 
2009d). We discussed the practice of regulating to the detection limit when this is the 
lowest level obtainable. However, if a candidate contaminant is only present in drinking 
water samples below the detection limit, a regulation would have limited potential to 
protect public health, likely precluding promulgation of an MCL. Advances in detection 
abilities could change this assessment. For potential targets of regulation, common 
occurrence of nondetects, or very low median concentrations of contaminants suggest 
detection ability might play a crucial role in the regulatory process. Contaminants not 
regulated today may be regulated when we become able to detect them. 
We reviewed the screening support document used to filter potential contaminants on the 
third contaminant candidate list (CCL3) to assess the significance of limitations 
attributable to detection capabilities. To assemble a preliminary CCL, US EPA starts by 
assigning the contaminants to “toxicity categories” 1 (most toxic) to 5 (least toxic), on the 
basis of toxicological data and weight of evidence narratives (US EPA 2009d). It then 
considers the median concentrations found of the contaminants in representative finished 
drinking water samples. The more toxic a contaminant, the lower the median 
concentration detected needs to be before it is considered a potential regulatory target. 
Out of the 107 chemicals arrayed in terms of toxicity category and median concentration, 
only one was in the lowest concentration range (0 to <0.1 µg), although, this chemical is 
in toxicity category 1 (most toxic). The bulk of potentially regulated contaminants are 
present in concentrations substantially higher than the detection limit. Thus, US EPA is 
already able to promulgate MCLs that would have a measurable effect on the 
concentrations found in finished drinking water. We cannot therefore conclude that 
detection capabilities are preventing promulgation of new drinking water regulations. 
Future improved detection capabilities are unlikely to lead to regulation of currently 
unregulated contaminants. Where detection ability prevents regulation of contaminants 
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down to the level fully protective of public health or down to the lowest level that would 
be cost-effective, US EPA would presumably resort to its practice of setting the MCL to 
the PQL (Relationship 2). Candidate contaminants are as constrained by detection ability 
as the large number of currently regulated contaminants already classified under 
Relationship 2. 
3.3 Discussion 
We outlined a mechanism by which improved detection capabilities would lead to lower 
regulations but found little evidence showing that this mechanism has had or will have a 
significant effect on the overall trend of regulation revisions as compared to the other 
factors US EPA considers in its regulatory determinations.  
Drinking water contaminants can be grouped according to the relationship between the 
associated public health goal (MCLG), recognized detection capability (PQL), and 
regulatory limit (MCL) in order to identify which are most susceptible to reregulation on 
the basis of improved detection, which are limited by cost-benefit analysis, and which are 
limited by the public health goal. Drinking water contaminants whose regulations are 
now equal to the recognized detection capability (MCL ≠ PQL) are the most vulnerable 
to reregulation on the basis of the mechanism we identified, but there are several reasons 
this does not tend to occur. 
US EPA is required to demonstrate that the costs of regulation will be justified by the 
benefits of new or strengthened regulation; this severely limits the likelihood of 
regulations departing from justifiable levels. Additionally, the mechanism we identified 
by which lower MDLs would lead to lower recognized PQLs and potentially stricter 
MCLs is short-circuited by the lack of widespread implementation of more sensitive 
methods at individual laboratories. Laboratory freedom to choose among approved 
methods and their predominant tendency not to use the most sensitive available seems to 
suggest that laboratory performance falls short of what is technically possible. 
Both laboratory underperformance, in terms of adopting more sensitive methods, and 
laboratory overperformance, with respect to the Water Studies, limit US EPA’s ability to 
take a position on the feasibility of lowering PQLs and hence possibly lowering MCLs. 
However, it is hard to predict how the conclusions regarding PQL adjustment feasibility 
would change as a function of improved assessment methods on the part of US EPA. 
Indeed, the difficulties associated with reregulating as a function of improved detection 
capabilities and/or assessing the real improvement of detection capabilities over time is 
echoed by the lack of precedent for this kind of revision. 
Within the data set we studied, we found no historical evidence for the claim that 
improvements in analytical capability alone lead to decreases in regulatory limits. 
Although we identify a mechanism making this possible, we note that US EPA’s methods 
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for enforcing laboratory standards and determining the PQL seriously limit the extent to 
which this would occur. As a consequence, there is good reason to believe that reductions 
in regulatory levels of contaminants will continue to be driven by improvements in 
toxicological understanding of contaminant effect or by improvements in economic 
feasibility of contaminant removal. 
We further conclude that the process by which new regulatory opportunities are explored 
is not limited by current detection capability, based on the high median concentrations of 
the bulk of the universe of drinking water contaminants relative to their limits of 
detection. US EPA is technically able to pass new regulations that are at least as 
protective as existing regulations with respect to the constraints imposed by limits of 
detection. Although we do not find the vanishing zero concept within the regulatory 
apparatus per se, we must note that increased detection capability undeniably facilitates 
regulatory debate of increasing numbers of contaminants. This distinction is well 
illustrated by perchlorate regulation efforts: an improved ability to detect contaminants 
triggered calls to regulate, but ongoing cost-benefit and other analysis has so far stalled 
those efforts. When regulation results from this circuitous but more plausible version of 
vanishing zero, this indicates that cost-benefit analysis has identified a meaningful 
opportunity for protection of public health. Although the concentrations of contaminants 
are venturing into the imperceptible, we can be confident the anticipated benefits would 
not be. 
Finally, this study only evaluates the claim that improved detection limits in and of 
themselves can lead to more stringent regulation. In the context of environmentally 
regulated industry, the vanishing zero claim would be more directly linked to the 
regulatory apparatus underlying the Clean Water Act or the Clean Air Act, which impose 




Regulation of chemical drinking water contaminants: risks, benefits and the hunt for 
equality in the Canadian context  
Drinking water quality management in Canada is based primarily on the intervention of 
individual provinces and territories. This contrasts with the American and European 
approach of uniform, legally enforced regulation at the federal or super-federal level. The 
Canadian model has been widely criticized for the unequal level of regulation between 
provinces and territories and the passive role taken by the federal government. Notably, 
criticism from environmental advocacy groups has focused to a large extent on the 
management chemical contaminants, whereas research on water governance has focused 
largely on the potential for pathogenic contamination. This chapter bridges the gap 
between a body of literature on water governance and mainstream discourse on 
jurisdictional issues in drinking water management. We investigate the principal 
arguments for giving legal effect to federal drinking water guidelines for chemical 
contaminants, compare popular claims about water quality with available data and add 
context with perspectives on risk perception and general principles in drinking water 
management. We compare current and proposed regulatory frameworks in terms of their 
implications for protectiveness of public health, responsiveness to emerging contaminants 
and equity among populations. We explain why claims of regional inequalities in 
drinking water quality are so persistent in the Canadian context but show that increasing 
the responsibility of the federal government may not lead to improved overall public 
health outcomes. We outline strategies for federal, provincial and territorial actors to 
improve the current decentralized framework and minimize the practical difficulties 
inherent in decentralized regulation. We conclude by explaining how a decentralized 
approach to regulation, based on risk management and economics, is most likely to be 
successful in the Canadian context when provinces and territories are actively engaged in 
the exercise of allocating money to public health initiatives in proportion with local risk 
profiles. Throughout, we identify opportunities for data collection that would allow for 
more confident, definitive pronouncements on risks and benefits of different regulatory 
structures and strategies. 
4.1 Introduction 
A series of outbreaks in Canadian public water systems in the early 2000s has made 
drinking water quality an important topic in public discourse. Although unsafe drinking 
water has usually been a topic connected to the developing world, the widely publicized 
Walkterton, North Battleford and Kashechewan outbreaks alerted the public that even in 
Canada, clean water cannot be taken for granted. Several prominent environmental 
groups have been critical of drinking water quality management in Canada (Sierra Legal 
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Defence Fund 2001 and 2006; Boyd 2006; Ecojustice et al. 2006: hereafter collectively 
referred to as ‘the drinking water reports’). These leading environmental groups focus on 
the chronically poor quality of First Nations water supplies, the inequality of drinking 
water standards among provinces and territories and, notably, the level of regulation of 
chemical contaminants in Canada versus other countries.  They conclude variously that 
the federal government is not sufficiently involved in drinking water management, that 
Canada’s decentralized regulatory model is inequitable and jeopardizes the health of its 
citizens and that the level of regulation in Canada is below that of other developed 
countries.  
Substantial research, both academic and government, has been directed at questions of 
water governance in Canada over the past ten years. This research tends to focus on water 
treatment system management and source water protection while taking current 
jurisdictional division of responsibilities as a given. On the other hand, researchers in 
environmental geography have thoroughly explored jurisdictional issues of water 
management, but mainly with respect to source water protection and allocation. 
Academic literature on jurisdictional issues in drinking water legislation in Canada is 
rare, and the water quality issues discussed focus on pathogenic contamination. 
Environmental groups however raise legitimate questions about the benefits of 
centralization versus decentralization of drinking water regulation, analysis and decision-
making notably with respect to chemical contaminants, not often discussed in literature 
on water governance.  
This paper is the first to examine the division of responsibility for drinking water quality 
in Canada in the context of total risk abatement including the risk represented by 
chemical contaminants. It is also the first academic paper to address the specific claims of 
environmental groups with respect to greater centralization. It brings to light compelling 
economic arguments for improving the current decentralized model as opposed to 
instituting greater centralization and explains the persistence and resonance of calls for 
centralization in the Canadian context. 
In this paper, we: 
1. put the claims made by Canada’s leading environmental groups in the context of 
Canada’s unique social and political climate and thereby explain their resonance 
with the public; 
2. evaluate centralized and decentralized frameworks for drinking water regulation 
in the context of risk management theory and practical challenges in the Canadian 
context; and 
3. explore the basis for inferring high risks from seemingly permissive regulation. 
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The paper closes by proposing areas of inquiry and data collection that would allow for 
more definite statements on the best way to rework Canadian drinking water policy in 
order to ensure long-term protection of public health. Particularly, it finds that the 
economic arguments in support of maintaining and improving decentralization are 
dependent on a demonstration that provinces and territories are actively engaged in risk 
abatement in other spheres of public policy.  
4.2 Background 
Water quality management became a topic of concern to many Canadians alarmed by 
widely publicized accounts of drinking water outbreaks in the early 2000s. Increased 
public awareness of the hazards of drinking water is reflected in the series of drinking 
water reports cited above. All these reports describe the current state of drinking water in 
Canada as unacceptable and criticise the nature and extent of the involvement of the 
federal government. As is generally the case (Slovic and Weber 2002), it has been 
extreme, isolated events like the outbreak in Walkerton, Ontario that have sparked the 
public’s interest in safe drinking water. The outbreak in Walkerton was responsible for 
over 2,000 illnesses and seven deaths in a small community (O’Connor 2002). However, 
this accounted for less than 3% of the total illnesses and less than 8% of the total deaths 
thought to be attributable to contaminated drinking water in Canada every year 
(Environment Canada 2008). This demonstrates that large populations stand to benefit 
from a dialogue on the improved management of drinking water, even though this 
dialogue is moved along by low-probability, high-impact events like the outbreak in 
Walkerton.   
The official policy of the federal government with respect to drinking water is known as 
the ‘multi-barrier approach’ (e.g. CCME 2004; Health Canada 2010) and aims to ensure 
access to safe drinking water through a system of regulation, monitoring, treatment and 
management. The Federal-Provincial-Territorial Committee on Drinking Water operates 
under Health Canada and publishes nonbinding guidelines for drinking water quality as 
well as related technical and toxicological support documents, guidelines for good 
practice, research reports, and other general information. Also, the federal government is 
responsible for drinking water quality on federal lands, including Indian Reserves. 
Otherwise, the ultimate responsibility under the law for water quality standards and other 
management measures falls to the provinces and territories.  
In that way, Canada stands out from other western, industrialized countries for the 
relatively passive role taken by the federal government in matters of drinking water 
regulation. Canadian provinces and territories have a high level of autonomy in 
environmental regulation, an arrangement that has come about more by tradition than by 
legislation. Matters of the environment are not explicitly assigned to federal or 
provincial/territorial jurisdiction in the Constitution, but extrapolation from the treatment 
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of natural resources has meant that it has been primarily the provinces and territories that 
are responsible for the regulation of the environment and settlement of conflict (Health 
Canada 2006). This arrangement has produced drinking water standards and management 
practices that vary a great deal between one province or territory and the next (Hill et al. 
2008).  Some critics have referred to this as a ‘patchwork’ of inequitable rules for 
drinking water management (Sierra Legal Defence Fund 2001 and 2006, Ecojustice et al. 
2010) whereby some Canadians are protected by more stringent rules than others. The US 
and the European Union, on the other hand, have adopted federally (or, in the case of the 
EU, super-federally) mandated drinking water quality guidelines that ensure consistent 
standards across their respective territories.  
Claims of inadequate federal intervention have also been based on the numerical value of 
maximum allowable concentrations (MAC) in Canada versus those of other countries; 
one study points out that Canada’s guidelines are very often less stringent than those of 
the US, Australia or even the World Health Organization (WHO) (Boyd 2006). The 
investigation into the Walkerton tragedy suggests that the relative permissiveness of 
Canadian regulations might be attributable to the federal-provincial-territorial 
subcommittee’s orientation towards consensus, which often leads to agreement on the 
‘lowest common denominator’ of public protectiveness (O’Connor 2002). Although, off 
federal lands, the Guidelines are not legally binding, they serve as a guide to decision-
making and undeniably have bearing on the standards adopted by provinces and 
territories. For example, Alberta has adopted the bulk of the federal Guidelines as its own 
legally binding standards.   
Drinking water quality management can be divided into two branches: 1) strategies to 
protect against short-term outbreaks, primarily attributable to spikes in microbiological 
activity in water supplies, and 2) management of long-term risks, usually associated with 
chronic trace chemical contamination. The principles governing the management of 
short-term risks are relatively few and well understood: monitor microbiological activity 
and treat contamination with standard treatment methods such as chlorination and 
filtration. The regulatory framework typically focuses on mandatory reporting of 
analytical results for microbiological parameters or chlorine residual and operator 
training requirements. The nominal guideline values for microbiological contaminants are 
often zero, or a prescribed treatment efficacy, and water quality goals vary little among 
industrialized countries. In contrast, long-term risks are managed by setting maximum 
allowable levels of contamination by various chemicals. Regulatory agencies determine 
the level of exposure that is safe by consulting toxicological data and balance these 
considerations with the cost and potential benefit of regulation. Extensive toxicological 
research, exposure characterizations and cost-benefit analysis govern the final numerical 
value that is assigned to these contaminants. As we will see, the higher the stakes and 
implications of the regulation, the more extensive and protracted the analysis. Competing 
opportunities for public investment, frequency of contaminant occurrence and other local 
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factors play important roles in regulatory decision-making that create potentially large 
differences in regulatory limits.  
Almost all known cases of illness and death due to drinking water contamination are 
attributable to breakdowns in these processes. Conversely, illness and death due to 
chemical contamination are extremely hard to trace back to drinking water on an 
individual level. This is due to the very small numbers of people that typically get sick, 
the long exposure periods that are typically necessary to cause a health response in 
exposed populations and the fact that the resulting diseases (notably cancer) cannot be 
categorized on an individual level according to cause. Correspondingly, the bulk of 
academic literature and government analysis on drinking water in Canada focuses on 
ensuring access to water free of the pathogens associated with immediately identifiable 
short-term illness and death. Notwithstanding this focus on the part of drinking water 
researchers and managers, environmental advocacy groups have devoted a high 
proportion of their attention to the management of chemical contaminants. This raises 
three interesting questions, in line with the three objectives of this paper: 1) why does the 
Canadian regulatory model for chemical drinking water contaminants represent such a 
liability in the eyes of environmental advocates? 2) Would a centralized approach lead to 
better water quality outcomes, and would it be more equitable? and 3) Are environmental 
advocates justified in inferring high risk from low regulation of chemical contaminants? 
4.3 Perceptions of risk and inequality as a driver for regulatory reform 
The outbreaks that capture public attention are not primarily related to the system of 
drinking water guidelines that establish maximum allowable exposures for a variety of 
contaminants as a function of cost benefit analysis, but rather, to breakdowns in 
mechanisms that are supposed to prevent exposure to a select group of microbiological 
parameters. In other words, short-term risks, rather than long-term, were behind Canada’s 
drinking water tragedies. However, public discussion of water quality management 
conflates these two types of risk. The drinking water reports bring public attention to the 
broader range of federal guidelines which they deem not adequately protective of public 
health for two reasons: they are not legally binding and they are in many cases less 
stringent than those of at least one other country. The extent to which claims of unsafe 
drinking water resonate with the public are highly consistent with research in risk 
perception. Pilisuk et al. (1987) found that drinking water tops the list of public concern 
for technological hazards with 79.1 % of respondents identifying as ‘very concerned’ and 
a further 15.1 ‘somewhat concerned’.  For comparison, 54.9% of respondents in the 
Pilisuk study described themselves as ‘very concerned’ about nuclear war. Concerns over 
abstract risks in drinking water are at the surface of the popular consciousness and may 
be easily triggered by claims of lax protection of water resources supported by easily 
relatable examples of regulatory failures. 
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Regional egalitarianism is a defining characteristic of the Canadian social context. Public 
polls indicate that Canadians are highly supportive of egalitarianism, that is, that income 
and opportunity should be independent of ability (Aalberg 2003). Canada’s system of 
equalization payments is a widely recognized symbol of inter-regional egalitarianism, in 
place since the 1950s and entrenched in the 1982 constitution, aiming to harmonize the 
quality of social services between richer and poorer provinces (Kellock and LeRoy 2007; 
Kasoff and Drennen 2008). These expectations of an egalitarianism that transcends 
economic realities are almost universal and, particularly in discussions of public health, 
unquestioned, with one study describing it as the ‘mantra’ of the Canadian context 
(Giacomini et al. 2004). Indeed, regionalism, as important as national unity and social 
welfare, has dominated political discourse and conceptions of representativeness and 
equality since Confederation. This contrasts starkly with, for example, the United States, 
where sex, race and ideology are the prevailing politically relevant categories 
(Malcolmson and Myers 2009). In the next sections, we examine motivations for 
addressing water quality management on a provincial level. Environmental advocacy 
groups argue that regional regulatory disparities imply regional injustice; a claim that 
resonates strongly with Canadians. 
The drinking water reports have been widely covered in the media and rank highly 
among internet search results for drinking water quality in Canada. Most other sources of 
Canadian water quality information are provided by the federal or provincial 
governments. These sources often fail to provide real data that laypeople could use to 
create informed opinions on water quality risk. Explicit references to events in the public 
consciousness (e.g. the Walkerton outbreak) are uncommon in the government literature 
reviewed. Other literature on the realities of drinking water in Canada is rare. Indeed, the 
drinking water reports provide a detailed and accessible overview of drinking water 
policies and reference current events of which an informed public would be aware. 
Although the focus of the reports varies, they establish a body of references that conclude 
Canada’s drinking water regulatory apparatus is flawed and that the risks are great. 
Because the drinking water reports represent many trusted names in environmental 
stewardship, greatly surpass other sources of information in terms of accessibility of 
information and agree with the risk implied by well-known and widely reported 
outbreaks, they likely play a large role in shaping the policy opinions of their readership. 
4.4 Regulation and water quality: limited basis for inference 
Popular discussion of drinking water quality in Canada, as exemplified by the drinking 
water reports, very often uses regulatory stringency as an analogue for water quality: high 
risk is inferred from lax legislation. This central claim is supported by demonstrating 
variously that the Canada-wide standards for chemical contaminants are weak compared 
to those of other countries, that they do not have the force of law, and that many 
provinces have not adopted strong legislation to protect drinking water from chemical 
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contamination. The argument that high-risk drinking water can be inferred from lax 
regulation is problematic in three ways: 1) regulatory stringency (or laxness) is a concept 
that has not yet been quantified and therefore cannot be used to rank jurisdictions in order 
of their protectiveness of public health; 2) there is no established multi-attribute 
framework for the risk of drinking water that would allow it to be similarly ranked in 
order of risk posed; and 3) beyond these barriers of analysis, there is no logical basis to 
infer high risk from low regulation or vice-versa. 
The difficulty of classifying drinking water according to total risk is attributable to the 
lack of framework for multi-attribute water quality (Schmitt and Calder 2011). Chemical 
drinking water contaminants carry diverse and disparate risks: long-term cancer, short-
term disability, reproductive difficulties and more. The difficulty of comparing the 
magnitude of these disparate risks is compounded by the diverse susceptibilities of 
individuals constituting a population served by a common drinking water source. The 
lack of methodology for establishing a “risk score” that prevents us from ranking 
drinking water in terms of absolute quality is the fundamental barrier to making a similar 
ranking of regulatory stringency. However, regulatory stringency is not only defined by 
the total risk abated, but by other measures, such as operator qualification and 
supervision, water quality monitoring and source-water protection. The relationship 
between source water and drinking water quality is further complicated by the 
effectiveness of the ‘barriers’ between the two, notably, treatment, testing and operator 
qualification. For example, the failure of these barriers was responsible for the Walkerton 
outbreak (O’Connor 2002).  
Figure 1 organizes source water and drinking water by risk, where ‘high’ indicates that 
the source waters are high-risk due to manmade or natural contamination, and ‘low’ 
indicates that the source waters are low-risk due to a low level of contamination. Figure 1 
shows that high-risk source water results in high-risk drinking water when regulation is 
high but ineffective or when regulation is inadequate. When underlying risk is low, 
however, the underlying regulatory framework is less important; neither high- nor low-
stringency nor effective nor ineffective regulation changes the risk of finished drinking 
water. A comparatively low level of regulation therefore does not imply high risk. 
Reasoning to the contrary ignores the probability that a given source water is low-risk to 
start with. Similarly, stringent regulation on paper might be improperly implemented, 
meaning that high regulation will not necessarily result in lower risk.  
To fully understand the difficulty of inferring drinking water risk from the level of 
regulatory intervention, we refer to Figure 2, which presents all permutations of source 
water quality, regulatory stringency and regulatory effectiveness.  Despite the important 
barriers to a more quantified analysis, we generally understand the current drinking water 
regulatory paradigm to be reactive rather than anticipatory, with drinking water 
regulations cropping up in a piecemeal way in response to emergent risks (Schmitt and 
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Calder 2011). Therefore, it seems more likely that a given dense regulatory landscape 
would imply an attempt at reducing a high source-water risk rather than a pre-emptive 
regulation of already-safe water.  Therefore, it is no more logical to infer high risks as 
opposed to low risks from permissive regulations: they may be lax because of low risk, or 
there may be high risk on account of lax regulations. The level of protection mandated by 
policy against a hazard says nothing about the magnitude of the associated underlying 
risk the policy is addressing. It is tempting to compare regulations (or any other measure 
to protect public health or wellbeing for drinking water or otherwise) between different 
jurisdictions and make inferences about the risks faced by those populations. However, 
given the limited data and tools for this type of analysis, the abundance of specific claims 
of high risk are likely to be premature. 
This structured conception of relative risk and stringency and the difficulties of rational 
comparison deserve individual attention in a separate paper. However, the difficulties 
inherent in doing this are well illustrated by Boyd’s The Water We Drink, published by 
the David Suzuki Foundation. In this report, we find a partial list of drinking water 
contaminants and the guideline (or regulated) values published by the governments of 
Australia, Canada and the United States, and by the World Health Organization (WHO). 
Boyd explains that ‘there are 55 contaminants for which Canada has weaker guidelines 
for the protection of drinking water quality than at least one other jurisdiction or the 
World Health Organization recommendation.’ He goes on to cite rankings of Canada and 
other governments and the WHO in terms of level of regulation for different 
contaminants. He paints a grim picture of the level of federal engagement in drinking 
water protection based on the observation that for the subset of contaminants examined, 
the Canadian guidelines are often not the most stringent value. This reasoning does not 
consider the magnitude of different provincial regulations that have the force of law in 
any case. In addition, we note that although Canada does not compare favourably in 
terms of level of numerical regulation for most contaminants, Canada has the highest 
number of regulated contaminants on that list. What are the implications for overall risk? 
Do the additional contaminants regulated compensate for the relatively low level of 
regulation of the entire list? What are the relative risk savings of other non-numerical 
water management practices? It is not possible to answer these questions without 
comprehensive exposure and toxicological data. We see that these simple comparisons 
quickly start asking more questions than they answer and are therefore perhaps better 
used to frame further enquiry into comparative risk analysis.  
The analysis developed in this section is most robust in the context of chemical 
contaminants from established sources producing water of a predictable quality. In the 
real world, accidental and exceptional microbiological contamination of water supplies is 
a regular occurrence. The numerical values of drinking water standards are much less 
important in preventing and responding to these events than the diverse operational 
protocols and programs established to minimize short-term risk. Therefore, the argument 
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that it is premature to infer risk from regulatory stringency and that regulatory stringency 
is too elusive a concept on which to judge jurisdictions applies only to unexceptional 
chemical contamination. This argument does not take away from demands that all 
drinking water systems be adequately prepared to handle unexpected pathogenic 
contamination that can befall any municipality, regardless of the normal water quality.  
In probing the commentary on regulatory stringency and drinking water risk, we have 
uncovered two areas where further research would significantly improve the formulation 
and allocation of resources to public health policies: 1) the development of a multi-
attribute measure of water quality and risk; and 2) the development of a measure of 
regulatory stringency. Likewise, the study of source water quality, regulatory response 
and resulting drinking water quality would allow us to identify 1) which management 
policies are effective in achieving public health goals; and 2) the likely future demands of 
the regulatory apparatus in an age of falling detection limits and densification of urban 
activity around receiving waters. Data on contaminant occurrence in source water and 
human exposure via drinking water are disappointingly rare and disorganized in Canada. 
Individual municipalities may publish results from water quality monitoring undertaken 
in compliance with relevant regulations, but data availability and management issues 
make it very difficult to compile the information and draw conclusions about drinking 
water quality characteristics on a national or even provincial basis. At the time of 
publication, no comprehensive drinking water contaminant exposure data has been 
published. Until the data necessary to make meaningful risk assessments on a large scale 
is available, our ability to undertake this type of research, to formulate a logical policy 
response on a national level or evaluate the effectiveness of current initiatives is severely 
limited.  
4.5 Legal status of drinking water guidelines and precautionary regulation 
The precautionary principle is the guiding regulatory principle in Europe and states that 
potential contaminants should be demonstrated to be safe before being widely used. The 
US and Canada use cost-effectiveness analysis with legally binding regulation; however, 
this does not apply to Canada’s non-binding drinking water guidelines. As a 
consequence, the federal government is currently able to post drinking water guideline 
quality values and standards for good practice at its own discretion, with little 
justification of the associated costs. It is up to the provinces to adopt (or not) the federal 
guidelines if it determines the benefits justify the costs. As we have seen, criticisms of the 
federal government’s role in drinking water quality cite its failure to be sufficiently 
engaged in protecting public health. However, if federal guidelines gained legal effect, 
we would anticipate a surge of criticism from the regulated industry and some provincial 
and territorial governments with demands for proof that expected benefits absolutely 
justify costs associated with meeting the guideline values. While Canadians would gain a 
common baseline water quality, we anticipate that this baseline would be designed to 
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withstand cost-benefit analysis; a framework in many ways incompatible with 
precautionary regulation. It is instructive to turn to the example of the US, whose 
centralized drinking water regulatory system resembles the desires of the critics of the 
Canadian federal government’s regulatory approach to drinking water.  
The US EPA regulates drinking water quality at the federal level on the basis of the Safe 
Drinking Water Act (SDWA), its amendments and other guidelines, such as executive 
orders treating the role of cost-benefit analysis within regulatory agencies. Since the 
regulations passed by EPA require mandatory compliance of all drinking water systems 
in the country, prior to regulation, EPA is required to demonstrate that a drinking water 
contaminant poses a threat to human health, that it occurs with frequency and at levels of 
concern to public health, and that regulation represents a meaningful opportunity for 
health risk reductions. Since 1998, EPA has made several regulatory determinations on 
compounds it has selected for evaluation from its Contaminant Candidate Lists (CCL), 
the system by which it identifies and screens possible new targets for regulation. In total, 
17 chemical contaminants have undergone review in an effort to assess whether health 
benefits would justify regulatory costs. Of these 17, six are thought to be present in the 
drinking water of at least one million Americans in levels that exceed EPA’s health 
reference level, while another four are thought to occur above the health reference level 
in the drinking water of between 100,000 and one million Americans. Still, EPA has 
decided against regulation for all 17 contaminants it has evaluated (Federal Register 2003 
and 2008). While it has taken the EPA ten years to decide against regulation of 17 
emerging drinking water contaminants, some of which affect large populations across the 
US, Health Canada has adopted guideline values for four of these, along with another six 
identified as candidates for regulation by EPA, but still pending evaluation. As always, it 
is up to provinces and territories to opt in to these standards. The slow pace at which 
drinking water regulation is decided upon or against in the US speaks mainly to the 
retarding effect of cost-benefit analysis, where reaction to a risk is delayed until EPA can 
justify why or why not it is appropriate to enforce new standards of water quality on 
publicly funded water systems across the country. The difficulty of this task is 
compounded by the nationwide variation in the relationship between costs and benefit of 
a hazard and a potential regulation, and the inherently subjective exercise of deciding 
whether it is more worthwhile to regulate all or none, and to what extent. 
We can only speculate on how Canadian federal agencies would have reacted if the 
stakes were as they are in the US, that is, with these regulations having the force of law. 
Still, it is worth noting some similarities that may justify extrapolation to the Canadian 
context. Like the US, Canada has a well-developed, mandatory regulatory impact 
assessment (RIA) process that is entrenched in the regulatory culture (Volkery 2004). 
The basic requirements of new regulations were reaffirmed most recently in 1999 and 
invoke a separate Environmental Assessment of Policy (EAP) and, burdensomely, a 
demonstration that the benefits outweigh the costs (Government of Canada 2000). This 
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language is more severe than the analogous US directives for cost-benefit analysis; since 
1993 only a demonstration that benefits of proposed regulations justify costs is required 
(Morgenstern 1999). As we have seen, data on contaminant occurrence on a national 
level are lacking in Canada, but we would not expect to see more homogeneous quality 
than in the US; the primary causes of water quality differences among American states 
are climatic, hydrologic and demographic variations as well as regionalization of 
manufacturing and agriculture (USEPA 1999) phenomena that define the Canadian 
context as well.   
Proponents of federal regulation tend to encourage allowing provinces and territories to 
enact stricter rules as they deem appropriate, so that the federal standards serve only as a 
baseline. This is technically the case in the US, where individual states are free to 
regulate any contaminants as long as the regulations are not lower than those 
promulgated by EPA. However, we note that only a minority of states (California, New 
Jersey and New York – representing about 20% of the US population) have numerical 
drinking water standards more stringent than those of EPA. The additional coverage 
provided by these states still leaves the majority of highly exposed populations without 
legal protection at the state level. Thus, while the goal of federal and state protection is to 
provide public safety, they are overlooked by both levels instead of being protected by 
both levels. To cite but one example, an estimated 10,000 to 781,000 Americans, almost 
entirely in states lacking sub-national drinking water regulation, are exposed to 
hexachlorobutadiene in their drinking water at levels above the health reference level 
(USEPA 2003). USEPA opted not to regulate hexachlorobutadiene because exposed 
populations were still too rare to justify a national rule. 
It is hard to extrapolate to the Canadian context. While a strengthened federal role might 
justify disengagement on the part of provinces and territories from this expensive 
regulatory arena, the self-propelling nature of bureaucracies might promote a dual system 
wherever provincial and territorial authorities have established a drinking water 
regulatory system. Indeed, we might expect a further fragmentation of the regulatory 
landscape as some provinces and territories disengage entirely and others stay their 
course.  While we have shown the requirement to conduct cost-benefit analysis slows 
responsiveness to emerging contaminants, we are not arguing for less cost-benefit 
analysis or a more precautionary regulatory culture. Indeed, increased precaution in 
drinking water regulation would mean some other benefit foregone. As we will see, there 
are competing opportunities for risk reduction and, without cost-benefit analysis, we 
would have no way of ensuring we are allocating money rationally. The facilitation of 
individual decision-making should be a major accomplishment of the Canadian system of 
publishing extensive nonbinding guidelines, notwithstanding the lack of proof that the 
guidelines would be cost-effective or rational instruments of policy. Indeed, individuals 
should be as informed as possible about relative risks and free to spend more to avoid risk 
than what would be economically tenable regulation. However, this accomplishment is 
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undermined by the consensus-oriented approach that dilutes the protectiveness of 
guideline values to appeal to provinces and territories that do not want to appear out of 
step with federal norms.  
4.6 Centralization, equity and water quality as a local issue 
Government-sponsored reviews of regulatory practices since the outbreaks in the early 
2000s have found several opportunities for improvement, but they have tended to 
criticize the provincial government procedures for monitoring and reporting, rather than 
inadequate regulation. The Walkerton report observes that the federal-provincial-
territorial subcommittee on water quality, the working group responsible for the 
nonbinding guidelines set at the federal level, has the tendency to settle on the lowest 
common denominator (i.e. less protective regulations) owing to its consensus-oriented 
structure. A stakeholder may agree to a regulation only as protective of public health as 
provided by the amount of money that stakeholder is willing to invest. For example, the 
high guideline value for turbidity is reportedly attributable to the Yukon being unwilling 
to invest in lowering turbidity and simultaneously not willing to be in violation of the 
Canadian guideline values; the result is that the standard at the federal level is higher than 
it would have been (O’Connor 2002).  
As this example indicates, the Canadian experience with national guidelines has already 
been one where cost considerations of the few may prevail over water quality 
considerations of the many; this reality is attenuated by the fact that the federal guidelines 
have no legal effect anyway. This contrasts with the American experience where 
regulation of emerging contaminants at the national level has been hampered by cost 
considerations of the many prevailing over health considerations of the few as well as 
health considerations based on emerging science. The burden of justifying a regulation 
everywhere it is applied is a major roadblock to national regulation of a primarily local 
issue, especially when legally binding. Real or emulated, centralized regulatory 
frameworks are subject to pressures that may lead to missed opportunities to protect 
public health. This can occur as in the Yukon by accommodating the objections of 
lagging sub-national jurisdictions, or as in the US, out of an inability to justify mandatory 
intervention across the country when only small populations would benefit, or when the 
benefits are uncertain. Although drinking water regulations would become more 
equitable if centralized, it might in fact be at the expense of public health in terms of 
drinking water risk. Conversely, removing the ability of provinces and territories to 
decide what level of drinking water intervention it can afford in consideration of other 
opportunities for risk reduction might in fact increase overall risk if the opportunity cost 
for a province or territory to meet federally mandated drinking water standards is high. 
Canada would make better use of the existing decentralized nature of its regulatory 
framework by basing health guidelines on the best available science, rather than 
weakening them to satisfy the interests of the provinces or territories.  
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In spite of the pressures facing EPA, we see that it ensures a baseline water quality to all 
Americans. Indeed, greater centralization in line with the US model would seem to 
represent progress towards equity among Canadians. Advocates of increased 
responsibility for drinking water regulation on the part of the federal government and a 
generally more centralized regulatory system cite equity among Canadians and surer 
protection of public health as the overall goals. Although centralizing rules and 
guidelines for drinking water quality management would help harmonize the risk 
attributed to drinking water contaminants, it might in some instances be at the expense of 
overall public health or wellbeing. Widely publicized debates over the regulation of 
arsenic and perchlorate in the US exemplify the great difficulty of calculating tradeoffs 
between cost factors and protectiveness of public health on a national level. This is 
particularly true when detection ability allows for quantification of compounds at level 
lower than the dose at which a health response has been measured or at levels 
unachievable by conventional treatment technologies (Calder and Schmitt 2010). 
Risk from drinking water contaminants, whether of short-term outbreaks or long-term 
cancer incidence, is but one part of a greater risk profile that influences public policy 
decisions. Standardization of water quality standards across Canada is in effect a move 
towards risk equity, but in terms of drinking water risk alone. The greater picture of risk 
is very regional, varying even from one Canadian province or territory to another. For 
example, the car accident death rate per 100,000 people between 2000 and 2004 was 7.0 
in Ontario, but 16.4 in the Yukon Territory (Ramage-Morin 2008). Obesity rates in 2004 
varied between 18% for men and 20% for women in British Columbia and 33% for men 
and 35% for women in Newfoundland and Labrador (Tjepkema 2008). Heavy drinking is 
more prevalent in Atlantic Provinces and in the Territories than elsewhere in Canada 
(PHAC 2010). Probably, risks attributable to drinking water quality vary nationally as 
well, though there has been no comprehensive study on the subject, as we have discussed. 
Regardless, it is certain that drinking water represents relatively greater risk in some 
jurisdictions than in others. The variability of these other risks means that drinking water 
risks do not rank consistently in regulatory priorities from one jurisdiction to the next. 
These other risks may also warrant public investment. Therefore, the Canadian model of 
decentralized regulation allows provinces and territories to decide on risk reduction 
priorities. It provides the freedom to, for example, allow some drinking water risk in 
exchange for reducing car accident or obesity risk, which may represent a more cost-
efficient use of public money. Since risks to the public are a local phenomenon, 
coordinating risk reducing investments at a national or super-national level is likely to be 
ineffective. Spending to diffuse drinking water risk, while perhaps a good decision for 
one area, might be a bad decision for another, if the opportunity cost is high. This is the 
flipside of the issue we explored earlier: that centralized regulation may tend to default 
against regulation where it is not justifiable everywhere.  
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The water quality guidelines decided upon by the federal government are in effect the 
result of some cost-benefit analysis. It is a value judgement produced on the basis of 
national data that is not likely to be the same for every province, territory or even city. In 
view of the problems liable to be caused by giving them legal effect across Canada, the 
federal government might instead aim to provide the (more) neutral cost-benefit 
information to enable local regulators to decide how much intervention is appropriate in 
consideration of their other problems and opportunities for public investment. 
Throughout our discussion of drinking water realities in Canada, it is clear that we could 
make better judgements about water quality if we had access to better data. To some 
extent, this is due to a shortage of original research or efforts to knit existing information 
together. Some of this stems from a lack of data availability and general government 
transparency. Although nothing on the federal level is legally binding, Health Canada and 
associated working groups have published considerable amounts of advisory information 
(e.g. nonbinding standards) that is obviously tailored to the Canadian context. However, 
researchers and the public have access to very little information on the decision-making 
process used to inform final federal government publications. This contrasts with EPA 
that publishes all supporting documentation for its regulatory determinations and allows 
for reinterpretation by researchers and other stakeholders.  
4.7 Practical considerations 
So far, we have outlined compelling arguments suggesting that decentralization of 
responsibility for drinking water quality is the best way to ensure protection of public 
health: decentralization allows local populations to allocate resources rationally and 
proportionally in the context of competing opportunities for investment. However, the 
decision-making required within fully decentralized regulation would carry substantial 
‘transaction costs’. Demanding that small agencies conduct cost-benefit analysis on the 
scale of what would be required to adopt a fully rational approach to investment in big-
picture risk reduction is clearly not feasible. Ranking risks of death and of different short-
term and long-term illness in terms of funding priorities and reconciling these with other 
public interests is too complex a task to demand from local governments. Analysis of 
tradeoffs and comparison of incommensurate risks rapidly becomes a subjective task, and 
it is not practical for this exercise to be repeated from start to finish in every province and 
territory.  
The federal government therefore might make a more meaningful contribution to the 
protection of public health if it aimed more explicitly to facilitate decision-making on the 
part of provinces and territories. Information on risks, costs and benefits could be used by 
provincial, territorial, municipal or other regulators to determine the appropriate level of 
intervention in consideration of other opportunities for risk reduction. This would serve 
the dual purpose of promoting the protection of localized highly exposed populations 
where a centralized regulation might be unwarranted (as in the case of emerging 
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contaminants not regulated by EPA) and accounting for the variable opportunity cost of 
drinking water risk reduction. Under this structure, for example, Yukon and Ontario 
could use the same data to justify respectively permissive and stringent standards for 
turbidity, a drinking water characteristic that is apparently a smaller spending priority in 
Yukon. The cost-benefit analysis would be done once, at the federal level, and the results 
would serve as the basis for provinces and territories to make rational decisions. Ontario 
already has binding regulations for a number of contaminants not regulated, for example, 
in the US, but it is not clear that the information on costs and benefits in the Ontarian 
context is available for other provinces and territories that might benefit from it.   
Arguments for decentralization of drinking water regulation in Canada depend on the 
premise that provinces and territories would invest rationally in public health initiatives if 
the federal government did not intervene. That is, the arguments outlined in this paper are 
persuasive if centralization of drinking water regulation would deprive Canadian 
provinces and territories of opportunities to address bigger public health hazards with the 
funds they are instead made to allocate to drinking water. This is principally because of 
the entrenched role of government as a re-allocator of resources and decision-maker in 
the interest of equalizing public health outcomes. However, in countries where the role of 
the government in public health intervention is less certain, such as in the United States, 
the arguments are not necessarily so limited.  
4.8 Native communities 
Drinking water management in native communities poses many unique challenges, as 
much for the Federal government as for native leaders. The most obvious challenge 
native communities pose to drinking water decision makers is their status outside the 
scope of provincial responsibility. Because provincial governments are not involved in 
negotiations with or management of native lands, the systems that ensure the safety of 
drinking water for the majority of Canadians are not applicable to residents of these 
communities. However, the jurisdictional challenges facing decision-makers are more 
complicated than optimizing allocation of responsibility. Indeed, chronic water quality 
problems in native communities are compounded by the challenges of ensuring access to 
safe water without violating native rights to self-government. We note also that native 
communities are distinct from the rest of Canada in that basic access to safe drinking 
water free from pathogenic contamination remains elusive. Here, debate on regulation of 
trace chemical contaminants is much less important than effective operational procedures 
for detecting and mitigating risk of short-term illness and death. Management of this type 
of risk has not been the focus of our analysis so far. Still, our analysis of drinking water 
in the Canadian context would be incomplete without this discussion.  
First Nations communities are the responsibility of the Federal Government and, along 
with federal lands such as national parks, are not within the jurisdiction of provincial and 
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territorial governments. Therefore, drinking water systems in First Nations communities 
slip past what is perhaps appropriately termed the ‘patchwork’ of regulation in place in 
Canada. Indeed, pathogenic outbreaks and boil-water advisories have become defining 
characteristics of native communities across the country. In 1995, Health Canada and 
Indian and Native Affairs Canada5 (INAC) identified that one quarter of the water 
systems in First Nations communities ‘posed potential health and safety risks to the 
people they served.’ In 2001, INAC found ‘a significant risk to the quality or safety of 
drinking water in three quarters of the systems.’ (OAGC 2005a.)  
While all parties agree there is a problem, sources differ as to the causes. The OAGC 
reports that the federal government has spent nearly $2 billion on safe drinking water 
initiatives in First Nations communities between 1995 and 2003 and attributes continued 
difficulties to the incomplete scope and intermittent application of federal policies on safe 
drinking water and inadequacies in the technical expertise available to native 
communities (OAGC 2005a).  
In 2006, INAC announced an action plan to ‘ensure that First Nation leaders have access 
to the tools and resources they need to deliver clean water to their residents’ (INAC 
2006). Tellingly, the announcement promised access to safe water via new tools and 
resources rather than a right to safe water. For example, the report does not mention a 
need for increased accountability on the part of water system operators or a new 
regulatory or monitoring framework. INAC and Health Canada accepted all of the 
OAGC’s recommendations in the 2005 report with the exception of the institution of a 
regulatory regime. Instead, they undertook to explore the feasibility of such a program, 
citing concerns over self-governance on the part of First Nations leaders (OAGC 2005a). 
Bill S-11, introduced in March 2010, is an effort to close what the sponsors of the Bill 
refer to as a ‘regulatory gap’ and allow the governor-in-council to give legal effect to 
certain types of recommendations related to drinking water on First Nations lands on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Health (Parliament of Canada 2010). As of April 
2012, the Bill is in the hands of the Senate Standing Committee on Aboriginal Peoples, 
that has been hearing stakeholder comments since February 2011. Thus far, comments 
indicate that concerns include lack of clarity on funding responsibilities among INAC, 
Health Canada and Environment Canada, the lack of provisions for funding any 
regulations that are eventually passed under the Act and a lack of consultation of First 
Nations peoples (Council of Canadians 2011).  
It is beyond our scope to evaluate the quality or extent of the consultations INAC has 
held. Still, the cost of delaying a regulation likely to improve drinking water quality 
might exceed the benefits of further consultation. Indeed, the Act serves merely to 
facilitate individual regulations that may be proposed at a later date and so this 
                                                 
5As of May 2011, this department is known as Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development 
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groundwork is essential to move forward with specific regulations that may lead to 
improved water quality imply further consultation themselves. However, as the Council 
of Canadians report points out, the Act does not enshrine consultation as a waypoint to 
more specific regulation.  
Beyond Bill S-11, there is some evidence to show that water quality in First Nations 
communities has improved in recent years. ‘High risk’ water systems, i.e. those likely to 
provide unsafe water owing to major deficiencies in several operational aspects, have 
decreased in number from 193 in 2006 to 49 in 2010 (INAC 2010).  
The proportion of First Nations residents considering their water as ‘somewhat safe’ or 
‘very safe’ increased from 62% in 2007 to 69% in 2009, although this figure remains 
substantially lower than the 89% of respondents in non-First-Nations communities of 
similar size (Ekos 2009). Although it is not immediately obvious that this is a significant 
increase, we see that it is, at least in the statistical sense, in that it is very likely there was 
a real improvement in respondents’ perceptions. The margin of error in the 2009 study is 
± 3.7 while in the 2007 study it is ± 2.5, 19 times out of 20 (Ekos 2007). The populations 
for the 2009 and 2007 studies are 687 and 1 502, respectively. Comparing the outcomes 
of the two surveys with the two-sample t-test produces a t value of 101.8 which is 



















Still, all actors agree there is a significant disparity between drinking water quality 
realities and perceptions in native communities, despite the efforts that have been made. 
Advances in legislation are slow and create anxieties about lack of consultation and 
funding. We have seen that even with heavy monetary investment, native communities 
are faced with a shortage of trained personnel and technical ability to implement 
measures that arguably give ‘access’ to clean water. Years of effort has led to the 
development of a regulatory framework that, given the reactions of stakeholders, seems 
as likely to exacerbate mistrust and create anxieties as it is to bring about improved water 
quality in the near future. Clearly, the challenges faced in the First Nations context 
transcend the topics of water quality management we have explored in this paper. Indeed, 
effective regulation and policy decisions depend on more than science; these decisions 
must have the trust of all stakeholders.  Adding to historical misgivings between First 
                                                 
6 Survey results are normal distributions centred at means equal to the point estimate of the outcome (69% 
in 2009 and 62% in 2007). The standard deviations of both normal distributions (1.27 in 2009 and 1.89 in 
2007) produce 95% of the probability density within the margin of error cited by Ekos (± 3.7 in 2009 and ± 
2.5 in 2007).  
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Nations and the Colonial population is the continued lack of transparency, as reflected for 
example in the Council of Canadians (2011) report, an experience shared by the broader 
Canadian population. 
4.9 Conclusions 
Canada stands out from other federations by virtue of the relatively passive role of its 
federal government and stronger role of provinces and territories. The assignment of 
responsibility has come about rather naturally in comparison to other countries where 
assignment to the federal government has occurred via statute, for example with the 
United States’ Safe Drinking Water Act. This decentralized responsibility for drinking 
water management has produced a highly heterogeneous landscape of drinking water 
regulation. Public interest in drinking water quality and management surged following 
several highly reported outbreaks, and several prominent environmental groups have 
independently and cooperatively weighed in on this issue since the early 2000s. These 
drinking water reports establish a body of literature claiming inadequate intervention on 
the part of the federal government and that the resulting framework is under-protective 
and inequitable, notably with respect to chemical contaminants. 
This paper has shown that Canadian political sensitivities to regionalism interact with risk 
perceptions to energize public opinion in favour of centralizing and strengthening 
regulatory intervention in drinking water. Concepts of long-term risk imposed by 
drinking water contaminants and the optimal outlay of public funds are abstract topics 
that continue to elude experts, to say nothing of a lay public. When dissenting claims of 
inadequate federal intervention and unequal protection are put in the context of the 
public’s existing uneasiness with the quality of drinking water and a deep cultural 
aversion to health inequalities, we see to what extent they are likely to reaffirm anxieties 
and gain currency with an informed public.  
The risk perceptions that energize public opposition to unequal drinking water standards 
may also explain the gap between the foci of academic and popular literature on water 
governance. As we have seen, the former focuses on developing effective barriers to 
minimize pathogenic contamination of drinking water, whereas the latter focuses very 
much on standards for chemical contaminants. This paper has bridged this gap. Through 
principles of risk analysis and by drawing on the experiences of Canada and the United 
States, we have shown that drinking water decision-making at the provincial/territorial 
level is a model more likely to provide cost-efficient, long-term protection of public 
health. However, we have pointed to two caveats: 1) decentralized decision-making is 
only likely to be feasible if resource-intensive cost-benefit analysis is centralized and the 
information made public; and 2) the Canadian public are only likely to support 
decentralization if provinces and territories are actively allocating public funds to public 
health initiatives in proportion with the magnitude of risks. In other words, if provinces 
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and territories opt to spend less money on drinking water risk abatement, the Canadian 
public are likely to demand they use the money saved on addressing a greater public 
health risk.  
Currently, the federal government markets its intervention in water quality management 
as being directly engaged with the health of Canadians. For example: ‘Its mandate and 
expertise lies in protecting the health of all Canadians by developing the Guidelines for 
Canadian Drinking Water Quality in partnership with the provinces and territories.” 
(Health Canada 2009). Critics are right to question the ability of the federal government 
to play this role when there is no legal mechanism enabling it to do so; ultimately, it is up 
to the provinces. In this regard, the federal government might gain legitimacy by 
embracing its real role as provider of information and expertise to assist more local levels 
of government that are actually legally responsible for drinking water quality to make 
rational decisions. It therefore seems that the best use of federal resources would be to 
ensure access to safe water where it is the responsible level of government and where it 
has neglected this responsibility, rather than repeating the work of provincial and 
territorial regulators.  
Cost-benefit and contaminant occurrence data are however currently very limited for 
regulations and guidelines developed in Canada, perhaps because guidelines developed at 
the federal level do not have the force of law. However, guideline values established at 
the federal level can be influenced by members of the federal-provincial-territorial 
subcommittee who want to strike a balance between a health-based standard and cost 
considerations (O’Connor 2002). Therefore, federal entities intervening in drinking water 
regulation are subject to the pitfalls of managing drinking water on a national level but 
are not affected by requirements for transparency and do not facilitate rational decision-
making on a more local level. This is perhaps the most serious barrier to efficient 
allocation of resources in drinking water risk abatement and an invitation to criticisms 
from commentators on environmental and health policy. On the other hand, an explicit 
reorientation to data provision and cost-benefit analysis would allow for transparent and 
cost-effective decision-making as well as enabling the policy research we need to ensure 
good governance well into the 21st century.  
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CHAPTER 5 
Drinking water regulatory decision-making: Sensitivity to contaminant occurrence and 
regulatory philosophy in the United States 
Drinking water regulatory decisions made in the United States since the passage of the 
Safe Drinking Water Act are analyzed in the context of contaminant occurrence patterns, 
sizes of exposed populations and risks faced by these populations. Two major shifts in 
the realm of drinking water regulation in the United States that, together, jeopardize the 
ability of centralized regulation to protect public health are shown to have occurred. The 
first is a shift in regulatory attention from contaminants relatively widespread and 
common to many urban areas to those that occur infrequently in a small number of water 
systems. The second is the entrenchment of a burden on the part of EPA to demonstrate 
regulatory benefits on a national level for any proposed drinking water regulation. 
Indeed, recent decisions not to regulate a large number of contaminants were made on the 
basis that the benefits of regulation would not be sufficiently widespread. It is however 
demonstrated that the risks posed by these contaminants are as great as or greater than 
those posed by several contaminants at the time of their regulation by EPA in earlier 
years. Continued protection of public health depends on an acknowledgement by 
decision-makers of the challenges posed by the current regulatory framework and the 
adoption of measures to bring regulatory decision-making into line with the nature of 
today’s contaminants and the public’s expectations of the distribution of risks and 
benefits. 
5.1 Introduction 
Drinking water regulation emerged in the 20th century as a tool to manage risks posed by 
source water contamination. In the United States, it has evolved to become both highly 
dependent on cost-benefit analysis and highly centralized in contrast to, for example, 
Canada, where responsibility for water quality falls on provinces and territories. Different 
approaches to drinking water quality management have all enjoyed relative success in 
delivering consumers water free of pathogens, bacteria and other traditional water 
contaminants. However, since the entrenchment of centralized regulation in the US, there 
has been a shift in the nature of contaminants of interest to regulators and the public: 
falling detection limits now allow us to resolve variation in water quality in terms of a 
vast number of contaminants at levels on the order of one in a billion. Regional variations 
in population density, representation of different industries and industrial density, and 
geophysical characteristics that in some cases exacerbate exposure to environmental 
contaminants have fragmented our understanding of the drinking water risk geography of 
the United States and other countries. Regional risk profiles imply diverging priorities for 
investment of public funds and force regulators to consider not only uneven risk but also 
unequal value of regulatory benefits.  
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We are interested in the ability of the centralized regulatory structure in place in the 
United States to continue to provide cost-effective protection of human health in light of 
the nature of emerging drinking water contaminants. We show that regulatory attention 
has in general shifted from contaminants common to many drinking water sources 
downstream from urban, industrialized areas to contaminants associated to particular 
industries whose occurrence in water supplies is very exceptional. This change in turn 
amplifies differences in decision-making outcomes among regulatory structures. In order 
to pass a regulation on a drinking water contaminant, the US Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) is required to demonstrate that a proposed regulation represents a real 
opportunity for protection of public health on a national basis, which it has failed to do 
for 20 out of the 22 new contaminants examined between 2000 and 2011. Meanwhile, 
many of these same contaminants have been regulated on more local levels in other 
jurisdictions (see Chapter 4). 
Regulatory decisions are justified by cost-benefit analysis and quantified assessments of 
risk and exposure. However, the interpretation of these analyses is grounded in the socio-
political context of the day. The qualitative philosophy governing drinking water 
regulation is articulated in the 1996 SDWA amendments: for a contaminant to be 
regulated, it needs to have an adverse effect on the health of persons, occur in public 
water systems with a frequency and at levels of public health concern and represent a 
meaningful opportunity for health risk reduction by regulation. Therefore, although there 
are guidelines for decision-making, they are still relatively subjective and open to 
interpretation. Before 1996, the regulatory philosophy seems to have been even less 
explicit. A quantitative analysis of the history of regulatory decision-making reveals the 
effect of this dynamic interpretation of public health goals.   
We examine the drinking water contaminants of interest to US regulators since the early 
1960s in terms of their occurrence in drinking water systems and the risks they impose on 
exposed populations. Comparing these metrics to outcomes of regulatory decision-
making, we see the pronounced effects of 1) an increasingly heterogeneous distribution 
of contaminants and 2) a political climate variably receptive to precautionary regulation. 
Few states exercise their freedom to regulate drinking water beyond the national 
standards. Therefore, the changing nature of drinking water risk warrants a new analysis 
and possibly some reassignment of federal, state and local government responsibilities in 
providing safe drinking water to Americans. Comparing outcomes of regulatory decision-
making to the occurrence and implied risk of drinking water contaminants over time, we 
see that the underlying regulatory philosophy and interpretation of quality goals 
overshadows the importance of quantitative analysis in deciding whether to regulate 
drinking water contaminants. The role of political climate on regulatory decision-making 
independent of any quantifiable decision-making metrics suggests the need for a more 
explicit, well-reflected regulatory philosophy that will govern long-term decision-
making. 
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5.2 Background and overview of drinking water regulation decision-making 
In the United States, the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) defines the roles of all levels 
of government in drinking water quality management. At the federal level, EPA is 
responsible for setting binding regulations, conducting research and monitoring the 
implementation of the Act. Enforcement is, in turn, primarily the responsibility of state 
governments (Pontius, 2002). The SDWA was passed in 1974 in response to revelations 
of widespread water quality problems in early 1970s. The Community Water Supply 
Study (CWSS) found that drinking water for 2.5 million people served by 397 water 
systems did not meet the 1962 standards passed by the US Public Health Service (US 
EPA, 1970). This represented 41% of the water systems and 14% of the population 
studied. Almost simultaneously, news broke on widespread cancer risks from by-products 
of water chlorination. On the eve of the passage of the SDWA, synthetic organic 
chemicals (SOCs) attributable to industrial development were found in the New Orleans 
drinking water supply, and the newly formed EPA announced a nationwide study to 
determine the extent of chemical contamination of drinking water (Okun, 2002).  
The National Primary Drinking Water Regulations (NPDWR) introduced under the 
SDWA in 1974 specified maximum levels in finished drinking water largely based on the 
1962 Public Health Service standards and findings of the CWSS. In 1976, the 
Environmental Defense Fund petitioned the EPA for not adequately enforcing the SDWA 
in part because it had not set standards for any of the myriad SOCs and disinfection by-
products identified in drinking water over the previous several years. The subsequent 
1978 Court of Appeals ruling instructed EPA to take action on the subject of organics in 
drinking water. The following year, EPA introduced its trihalomethane rule. The other 
organics were addressed by the 1986 amendments to the SDWA, mandating that 83 
contaminants be regulated by 1989. This included a number of contaminants that had 
already been regulated under the 1974 regulation, with interim deadlines in 1987 and 
1988. Each contaminant was to be regulated as close as ‘feasible’ to the maximum 
contaminant level goal (MCLG), a quantity that represents the highest concentration of a 
contaminant in drinking water believed with confidence to be safe. This condition forced 
the revision of some regulations from the initial criteria promulgated in 1974. For many 
contaminants, particularly carcinogenic contaminants that are assumed to carry some 
level of risk at any dose, the MCLG is zero. Determining how close to zero a contaminant 
can feasibly be regulated therefore requires balancing costs of compliance with the 
associated public health benefits.  
By 1992, EPA had regulated 82 of the 83 contaminants required by the 1986 SDWA 
Amendments7. Although EPA had the responsibility of deciding what MCL was 
‘feasible’ for the prescribed contaminants, it did not identify which contaminants to 
                                                 
7 Sulfate was never regulated 
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regulate out of the hundreds of thousands of possibilities. Its only discretion was the 
latitude to choose up to seven of the 83 mandated contaminants to substitute with 
contaminants that in EPA’s judgement represented greater opportunity for public health 
protection8 (US EPA, 1989). This top-down regulatory process consisted essentially of 
lawmakers decreeing regulatory priorities and obligating EPA to set health-protective 
values. However, the 1986 Amendments did require EPA to itself identify regulatory 
priorities following regulation of the first 83 contaminants: 25 new drinking water 
contaminants were to be identified and regulated every three years starting in 1991. This 
requirement was never met:  no new contaminants were regulated between 1993 and 
1998, when the 1996 SDWA came into effect and established the framework in place 
today. The 1986 Amendments were passed against the backdrop of calls to reduce the 
burdensomeness of regulation, as exemplified by President Reagan’s 1981 executive 
order no. 12291, requiring that the benefits of new regulation ‘outweigh’ the costs. The 
difficulty of meeting this condition contextualizes EPA’s inability to identify and regulate 
new drinking water contaminants beyond the mandated 83. President Clinton’s executive 
order no. 12866 decreased the burden of proof such that the benefits only had to ‘justify’  
the costs (Morgenstern, 1994).  
Since 1998, EPA has been required simply to evaluate five contaminants for regulation 
every five years, with no regulation quota. EPA now compiles contaminant candidate 
lists (CCL) to track opportunities for drinking water regulation and has since 1998 made 
20 regulatory determinations. None of the CCL contaminants were found to represent 
meaningful opportunities for public health protection, because they are too rare. Beyond 
these 20 contaminants, EPA regulated uranium and has decided to regulate perchlorate 
and made revisions to existing standards for radiological contaminants and arsenic. 
Therefore, since 1998, EPA has decided against regulation for 20 out of the 22 new 
contaminants it has examined as candidates. These determinations are made on the basis 
of occurrence and toxicological data and test the applicability of the three statutory 
requirements of a proposed drinking water regulation under the 1996 Amendments, 
described in Section 1.. The large majority of the contaminants from CCL1 and CCL2 
that EPA did not regulate failed to meet the condition of sufficient occurrence in public 
water systems.  
States have the freedom to pass drinking water regulations as long as they are not less 
stringent than federal standards, but as of 2011, only three have done so. Residents of 
California, New Hampshire, New Jersey and New York benefit from state-level legally 
binding drinking water quality standards, with more localized analysis comparing 
drinking water risks to abatement costs in the context of a more localized portrait of risk 
reduction priorities. The diverse conditions of the remaining 243 million Americans are 
                                                 
8 Removed : aluminium, dibromomethane, molybdenum, silver, sodium, vanadium, zinc. Added: aldicarb 
sulfone, aldicarb sulfoxide, ethylbenzene, heptachlor, heptachlor epoxide, styrene, nitrite 
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aggregated into the cost-benefit models of the EPA to monitor and forecast the 
relationship between costs and benefits of existing and potential drinking water 
regulations. Indeed, cost-benefit analysis plays a crucial role in drinking water regulation, 
determining the level of intervention where decision-makers are unconstrained by 
detection ability and where dose-response models imply additional risk at any dose 
greater than zero (Calder and Schmitt, 2010).  Numerical standards are only one part of 
drinking water quality management and would be ineffective without a framework 
ensuring adequate monitoring, water supply operator training, treatment and so on. Still, 
the numerical standards determine the end goals of these other water management 
strategies, define how quality is measured and essentially govern decisions on source 
water selection and treatment requirements. They are perhaps the single most important 
element of drinking water quality protection.   
5.3 Occurrence, distribution and regulatory outcome of drinking water 
contaminants over time 
We illustrate the increased heterogeneity and localization of drinking water contaminants 
of interest to regulators since the 1980s, as compared to the regulatory priorities of the 
1960s and 1970s. A comparison of regulatory determinations in the 1980s to the 2000s 
furthermore shows that different outcomes are possible for contaminants with similar 
occurrence profiles. We compare regulatory decision-making outcomes on the basis of 
risk profiles in the next section. We show that as attention shifted from contaminants 
widespread in water systems to contaminants that affect discrete populations, regulation 
of these new contaminants was possible due to a political culture open to precautionary 
regulation.  Political culture began to change after the 1986 amendment, demonstrated by 
an aversion to government intervention as a solution to environmental problems. EPA 
therefore faced increased difficulty in justifying regulations of rare contaminants that 
would add a burden of compliance nationwide.  
The CWSS provided the bulk of the data on contaminant occurrence in public drinking 
water systems used to develop the NPDWR of 1975. The National Organics 
Reconnaissance Survey (NORS) and the National Organics Monitoring Survey (NOMS) 
of the mid-1970s were undertaken in order to investigate the extent of disinfection by-
product and synthetic organic chemical contamination in drinking water. The 
trihalomethanes rule of 1979 and the SDWA amendments were informed by these 
studies. The CWSS aimed to characterize drinking water quality in all sizes of water 
system, in urban and suburban areas in all regions of the continental US in terms of the 
1962 PHS water quality criteria. The 1962 standards made a distinction between 
standards that indicate that other drinking water sources should be used, where available, 
and standards that indicate a given supply should be rejected (US PHS, 1962). EPA 
referred to these as recommended and mandatory standards, respectively (US EPA, 
1970). System noncompliance and size distribution data from the CWSS were combined 
 70 
to analyze the extent of water quality problems in the US at the beginning of the 1970s. 
The CWSS provided noncompliance data in terms of percentages of systems in the study 
but generally not in terms of populations affected. The CWSS did however identify how 
many water systems fell into different ranges of populations served. We used the ranges 
to create low and midpoint assumptions about the sizes of the water systems in each 
range that pass or fail mandatory or suggested standards. Calculations using high 
assumptions were excluded because the midpoint estimate is already an adequate upper 
bound. This is for example the case for total exceedences (mandatory or recommended, 
all system sizes combined): EPA reported 2.5 million Americans served by drinking 
water not meeting either recommended or mandatory standards, compared to our 
midpoint estimate of 5.2 million and our low estimate of 1.6 million. About 30% of 
Americans were therefore served by water not meeting the 1962 standards (recommended 
or mandatory) with higher proportions in smaller water systems, particularly in the case 
of mandatory standards. For example, while only 1 to 2% of the total survey population 
was exposed to drinking water out of compliance with the mandatory limits, this figure 
jumps to 5 to 10% when we consider only water systems serving 25 000 people or less, 
and up to 24% for water systems serving 500 people or less. This cursory inspection 
demonstrates the severe water quality issues in pre-SDWA America. Table 5.1 
summarizes this analysis.  
CWSS data on violation of standards and the sizes of exposed populations were 
compared to the values of the subsequently enacted NPDWR. Generally, the NPDWR 
addressed those contaminants that the CWSS showed to be adversely affecting water 
quality on a national scale.  The CWSS in turn included contaminants targeted by the 24 
recommended or mandatory 1962 PHS standards, with several exceptions. The CWSS 
tested water for 25 contaminants including boron and turbidity and excluding phenols, 
differing in that respect from the 1962 PHS standards. Of the 25 contaminants tested 
within the CWSS, there were detections beyond either the recommended or mandatory 
standards in 20, with 15 having detections exceeding standards in more than 1% of the 
public water systems examined. In response, the NPDWR targeted 16 contaminants, 
seven of which (four pesticides9, two herbicides10 and mercury) had not been evaluated 
by the CWSS, and one of which, silver, had been evaluated by the CWSS but found not 
to exceed the PHS standards. The remaining eight had been tested by the CWSS and were 
found in levels exceeding the PHS standards, although four of these affected less than 
one percent of all PWS tested. Finally, ten contaminants detected by the CWSS in levels 
exceeding the recommended 1962 PHS standards (but none exceeding the mandatory 
standards) were not regulated by the NPDWR. This analysis is summarized in Table 5.2.  
                                                 
9 Endrin, lindane, methoxychlor and toxaphene 
10 2,4-D and 2,4,5-TP (Silvex)  
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This comparison of the results from the CWSS with the ensuing NPDWR serves mainly 
as an illustration of the widespread benefits of the earliest drinking water regulation. 
However, the regulation of four pesticides and two herbicides under the NPDWR is 
noteworthy in another sense: EPA does not seem to have considered its occurrence in 
drinking water supplies when developing the regulation. Beyond the lack of inclusion in 
the CWSS or discussion of occurrence in the supporting material for the interim NPDWR 
(US EPA, 1976), studies available at the time of regulation indicate that these 
contaminants occur rarely and at orders of magnitude below the applicable health levels 
in drinking water and surface water (for toxaphene, see US EPA, 1971a and for 2,4-D 
and 2,4,5-TP see US EPA, 1971b). This is antithetical to EPA’s current strategy for 
priority-setting that focuses strongly on contaminant occurrence in water systems and has 
been the grounds for almost all the negative regulatory determinations made since 2000.   
The National Organics Reconnaissance Survey (NORS) was carried out in 1975 to 
determine the extent of occurrence of trihalomethanes (THM)11, a class of suspected by-
products of the drinking water chlorination process previously detected in samples of 
finished drinking water. This study also examined two chlorinated chemicals12 previously 
detected in finished drinking water but not necessarily linked to water disinfection (US 
EPA, 1975a). Table 5.3 displays the results from the NORS study and reflects the finding 
that they were generally widespread. The water systems contributing data to the study 
were chosen to reflect a wide range of raw water sources and treatment practices but were 
not analyzed in terms of populations served in order to quantify population exposure. The 
statistics in Table 5.3 therefore refer to the distribution of results, with each water system 
out of the total of 80 providing one sample. The NORS report handles total 
trihalomethanes in terms of moles per litre, that is, adjusted to express total concentration 
in terms of total number of molecules. Because subsequent regulation and analysis has 
tended to be in terms of a simple sum of the concentrations without regard to differences 
in molecular weights, Table 5.3 displays total THMs in terms of µg/L, calculated 
manually from the raw data in the NORS report. Where individual water systems 
reported any of the individual THMs as ‘not found’, a concentration for that THM equal 
to the average detection limit displayed in Table 5.5 was used to calculate total THM for 
that data point, unless the water system gave information about the particular detection 
limit (e.g. ‘not found in levels above 1 µg/L’), in which case that detection limit was 
used. Alternatively, total THMs could have been calculated using a concentration of 0 
wherever ‘not found’ was reported without a significant effect on the result.  
                                                 
11 Chloroform (trichloromethane), bromodichloromethane, dibromochloromethane and bromoform 
(tribromomethane) 
12 1.2-dichloromethane and carbon tetrachloride 
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The original THM rule passed in 1979 set the maximum concentration of total THMs at 
100 µg/L. This was revised in 1998 to 80 µg/L at the same time as other disinfection by-
products were regulated, notably the group of haloacetic acids (US EPA, 2011). It is not 
clear to what extent the health effects of THMs were understood by regulators at the time 
of regulation in 1979. As of 1975, EPA considered the risks to human health real but 
unquantifiable (US EPA, 1975b). In any case, the original regulation of 100 µg/L 
corresponds to the 80th percentile of the water supply systems sampled in NORS. The 
National Organics Monitoring Survey (NOMS) conducted a more extensive analysis of 
total THMs, among other compounds (US EPA, 1977). From this data set, the 1979 
regulation of 80 µg/L corresponds to the 70th percentile of water supply systems sampled. 
Regardless of our confidence in the underlying toxicological basis for this level of 
regulation, it is clear that the 1979 rule affected a substantial portion of Americans served 
by chlorinating public water systems. 
Data from cities reporting to NOMS were harder to summarize on a comparative basis 
than those from NORS: reporting cities returned between one and four samples for a 
given contaminant, each with different handling methods. For a given contaminant and a 
given reporting city, there were often detections in some samples and non-detections in 
others with most results of most parameters being non-detects at detection limits 
relatively close to the median value of detections. In this case, our treatment of non-
detects has a more significant bearing on the representation of the data set. We have 
therefore excluded the non-detects from the data altogether and the other results for a 
given contaminant were averaged to represent the contaminant concentration for a given 
reporting city.  The exception to this was one result for 1,2,4-dichlorobenzene, where the 
average of the two detections would have been equal to 50.2% of the higher detection, 
thus skewing the result downward. Although this preserved higher value is in effect the 
maximum value out of all reporting cities for this contaminant, as displayed in Table 5.3, 
there is no impact on subsequent analysis because of the higher value of the ensuing 
regulation. Averaging the results for the other reporting cities did not otherwise mask 
high detections. The percentile data for the population of detections is presented 
alongside the size of this population for each contaminant, out of a total of 113 systems 
tested, to demonstrate how many points were censored to the left of the detection limit.  
Table 5.3 compares the NOMS findings to those from NORS and to the regulations that 
resulted from the 1986 SDWA amendments as discussed in Section 2. Of the 83 
contaminants set to be regulated under the 1986 amendments, 13 had been studied in 
NORS or NOMS13. Nine of these 13 contaminants were regulated at a level greater than 
the maximum detection in either of the studies14, suggesting that the utility of these 
                                                 
13 Counting total but not individual trihalomethanes 
14 Including 1,2-dichloroethane whose maximum detection in NOMS and carbon tetrachloride whose 
maximum detection in NORS were less than their eventual regulatory levels.  
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regulations is constrained to avoiding exposure of consumers to water with levels higher 
than the MCLs adopted, that is, pre-emptive regulation. Thirteen contaminants between 
the NORS and NOMS were found in at least ten public water systems nationwide, eight 
of which were regulated under the 1986 Amendments. The other five contaminants 
regulated under the Amendments were found in fewer than ten water systems nationwide, 
notably vinyl chloride and ortho-dichlorobenzene, with two and three detections 
respectively in NOMS. These two examples are also among the nine that were regulated 
to levels higher than the maximum level detected. Only three contaminants regulated 
under the 1986 Amendments were at least somewhat widespread (detected in at least ten 
water systems) and present at levels higher than the ensuing respective regulations: total 
THMs, 1,1,2-trichloroethylene and carbon tetrachloride.  
Notably, two of the seven contaminants EPA opted out of regulating to the lowest level 
feasible under the 1986 SDWA Amendments (silver, which had already been regulated 
under the NPDWR, and zinc) had occurrence data from either the CWSS, NORS or 
NOMS. However, none of the seven contaminants substituted for regulation had 
occurrence data either. This is a powerful indicator that real occurrence in public water 
systems was not a strong factor in EPA’s decision-making at the time of implementation 
of the 1986 Amendments.  
The 1998 Stage 1 Disinfectants and By-products Rule (DBPR) adjusted the total THM 
regulation from 100 to 80 µg/L and set standards for five haloacetic acids (HAA5)15 and 
specific disinfection residuals. The 1998 Enhanced Surface Water Treatment Rule 
(ESWTR) addressed microbiological agents cryptosporidium and giardia in addition to 
revising the turbidity standard. The 2000 radionuclides rule revised the standards for 
gross alpha and beta, radium 226 and 228 and established a uranium standard. The 2001 
arsenic rule revised the existing standard based on revised toxicological information and 
feasibility of implementing a lower level (US EPA, 2009).  
The occurrence data for these last examples are hard to analyze in a fashion symmetrical 
to what we have presented so far. The principle data set for occurrence of contaminants 
and disinfection residuals addressed by the Stage 1 DBPR came from the survey carried 
out under the Information Collection Rule (ICR). The data are presented as numbers of 
treatment plants presenting detections within certain ranges (e.g. 13 groundwater plants 
with detections of total THM between 20 and 30 µg/L in the period between July and 
September 1997). Because the individual data points are not specifically known and can 
only be ordered by range, and because of some censoring issues (the highest category is 
>130 µg/L), percentiles can only be expressed in terms of ranges. A similar approach was 
adopted for chlorite and HAA5. The data for bromate could not be meaningfully analyzed 
in a similar way because the majority of the data points were censored in the > 30 µg/L 
                                                 
15 Dichloroacetic acid, trichloroacetic acid, chloroacetic acid, bromoacetic acid and dibromoacetic acid 
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range. We can only say therefore that the maximum, 95th percentile and median values 
are greater than 30 µg/L. All occurrence data for the contaminants regulated between 
1998 and 2001 plus perchlorate are summarized in Table 5.4, with the exception of 
chloramine and chlorine dioxide. These latter two compounds are disinfection chemicals, 
and their concentrations are a product of water treatment practice. They differ in this way 
from other contaminants in that there is no characteristic of source water quality that 
contributes to their occurrence in finished water.  
The principal radionuclide occurrence data used for drinking water regulatory decision-
making in the 1990s and 2000s came from the National Inorganic and Radionuclides 
Survey (NIRS) on drinking water and a subsequent study on radionuclides in 
groundwater carried out by the United States Geological Survey (USGS). (65 FR 21576). 
These studies are in turn discussed in the technical support document for the 2000 
radionuclides rule (US EPA, 2000). Establishing percentile ranks for radionuclides is 
difficult because the bulk of results for most contaminants are below the reporting 
threshold. Table 5.4 shows, essentially, that the regulations are high compared to the bulk 
of results. Still, the technical support document indicates that about 10 000 water systems 
(roughly half of them serving fewer than 500 persons) out of a total of 53 000 exceed the 
MCLs adopted for one or more radionuclides. Therefore, radionuclide occurrence with 
respect to the ensuing regulatory values was rather more widespread than the bulk of 
contaminants regulated under the 1986 SDWA Amendments. Similarly, the 2001 revised 
arsenic regulation of 10 µg/L falls below the 95th percentile of occurrence, and the 
updated disinfection byproducts rule had implications for relatively large populations. All 
our estimates for arsenic occurrence after the 1990s are based on EPA’s technical fact 
sheet (EPA, 2001) and occurrence summary document, drawing together data from 
SDWA compliance monitoring activities, the USGS database, the NIRS and from the 
Safe Drinking Water Information System (EPA, 2000). 
Data for the 20 contaminants EPA assessed and decided not to regulate within the CCL 
since 2001 were analyzed and compiled in Table 5.5. These are the first contaminants 
chosen from the first two contaminant candidate lists (CCL1 and CCL2) to have 
undergone regulatory decision-making. Also included is perchlorate, which EPA has 
decided to regulate after extensive analysis and consultation. For context, the health 
reference level (HRL) calculated by EPA for each contaminant is provided. In the case of 
noncarcinogenic contaminants, this level is based on the level of no observed adverse 
effect (NOAEL), or the lowest observed adverse effect level (LOAEL). For carcinogenic 
contaminants, the HRL generally corresponds to the one-in-a-million (10-6) additional 
cancer risk level. From Table 5.5, we see that five of the 19 contaminants were never 
found in levels exceeding the HRL. However, we also see that significant populations 
across the US are exposed to the contaminants considered for regulation at levels of 
potential public health concern. The majority of these are not especially localized. 
Exceptions are DCPA, detected only in Michigan at levels above the HRL; DDE, 
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detected only in Alabama at levels above the minimum reporting level (MRL) and hence 
the HRL, as in this instance HRL > MRL; 2,4-DNT detected only in Tennessee at levels 
above the MRL and hence the HRL; and hexachlorobutadiene, detected at significant 
levels in Florida and also but to a lesser extent in Alabama, Arizona, New Jersey, Ohio 
and Tennessee. It is striking that the ‘low’ levels of occurrence (relative to the total US 
population) are cited as reasons precluding regulatory action when so many regulations in 
the past have been passed without evidence of occurrence at levels of concern.  
The contaminants examined for regulation from CCL1 and CCL2 plus perchlorate have 
relatively detailed occurrence information, collected within the Unregulated Contaminant 
Monitoring Program Rounds 1 and 2 (UCM Round 1 and UCM Round 2, 1988-1997) 
and within the first phase of the UCM program as revised by the 1996 amendments to the 
SDWA (UCMR 1, 2001-2005). The notation used to describe these three data sets 
follows that of EPA (e.g. 2011) We see that most of these contaminants are expected to 
affect populations on the orders of 100 000 to 1 000 000 at levels of concern. One 
exception is perchlorate, for which EPA has developed a range of HRLs, from 1 to 47 
µg/L, based on its effects on people at different life stages. Considering an HRL of 1 
µg/L, the size of the exposed population is an order of magnitude greater than that of the 
high end of the other contaminants (> 16.6 million). However, this is the total population, 
not the size of the relevant subpopulation the HRL targets. Still, even at the maximum 
HRL of 47 µg/L, corresponding to the least sensitive life stage, the exposed population is 
still between 110 000 and 400 000.  
However, these populations are connected to a relatively small number of water systems. 
In most cases, the 99th percentile of detections is below the reporting limit, and a 
meaningful statistical analysis can only be done on the subpopulation of detections (US 
EPA, 2002 and 2003a to 2003l). The occurrence profiles of the post-2000 CCL 
contaminants are therefore similar to those regulated under the 1986 Amendments, with 
low doses of perchlorate being consistently more present than the others. The most 
striking difference is the relative availability of occurrence data for the CCL 
contaminants. Evaluating occurrence of CCL contaminants with respect to their 
respective health reference levels is a useful way to measure how widespread 
contamination is at levels of concern. It would therefore be useful to make this 
comparison for contaminants regulated in the 1970s and 1980s, but this would not be a 
fair comparison as this concept surfaced in analyses on drinking water regulatory 
decision-making only in the 1990s.Although the number of individuals exposed to these 
contaminants of concern is not negligible, the contaminants fail to meet the subjective 
regulatory criterion of being present sufficiently often. 
Drinking water regulations passed before the 1980s were in general widely protective of 
public health and relevant to large numbers of water systems, with regulatory limits in 
general lower than contaminant concentrations commonly encountered. However, we 
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have also shown that widespread contaminant occurrence in this period was not a 
necessary condition to regulation, with several contaminants regulated without 
occurrence data or even where available data suggested that occurrence was rare. 
Contaminants regulated under 1986 Amendments were primarily organic and decidedly 
rarer and present in lower concentrations than those contaminants previously of interest. 
Occurrence of these contaminants was mostly not known, and for most of those 
contaminants whose occurrence was known, the regulatory value was higher than the 
maximum concentration detected. Indeed, regulation of this new class of contaminants 
was almost purely pre-emptive. For the most part, this pattern of contaminant occurrence 
has continued to the present day. Regulation has however generally not occurred, 
signalling a shift away from pre-emptive action on the part of regulators. Figure 5.1 plots 
the shift in contaminant occurrence characteristics and the shift away from precautionary 
regulation on top of a drinking water regulatory timeline.   
5.4 Risk-based analysis of regulatory decisions 
Carcinogenic contaminants provide an opportunity for a more quantified analysis of the 
changing drinking water regulatory landscape. Although the occurrence of 
noncarcinogenic contaminants can be assessed with respect to their HRLs, their varying 
health effects and non-quantified levels of toxicity make comparisons difficult. On the 
other hand, carcinogenic contaminants are generally modelled by EPA as having a linear 
dose-response model with a quantified slope and calculable additional cancer risk levels 
at different doses. This makes comparison, for example for the purpose of measuring the 
risk posed by different contaminants, relatively easy. EPA uses weight-of-evidence 
(WOE) rankings to evaluate the carcinogenic potential of different substances. We use a 
binary approach and divide contaminants broadly between ‘carcinogenic’ (meaning EPA 
has assigned a carcinogenic dose-response relationship) and ‘non-carcinogenic’, 
including those contaminants that are not classifiable with respect to carcinogenicity on 
account of insufficient evidence.   
We use this approach to estimate the number of additional cancers expected on the basis 
of occurrence values of different carcinogenic contaminants, both previously regulated 
and assessed for potential regulation by EPA. This provides an objective measure of how 
regulation has addressed cancer risks over time. Retrospective assessment of risk 
countered by regulations pre-1980 is however problematic, because the tools developed 
for this purpose did not exist and were not used by regulators as they are today. The risk 
analysis tools used by regulators today emerged with National Academy of Science’s 
‘Red Book’ (NRC, 1983), and the toxicological information used to derive dose-response 
models for different contaminants has accumulated to the present day. Calculating risk 
information for contaminants regulated before the 2000s can only be done on the 
understanding that this information was not available to regulators at that time. 
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Occurrence data for carcinogenic contaminants regulated since 1960 and contaminants 
studied within the CCL process were combined with EPA dose-response models to 
determine risk levels associated with higher exposures of contaminants over the years. 
This analysis is summarized in Table 5.6.   As discussed, almost all samples for most 
contaminants analyzed within the CCL process returned results of non-detect. To 
estimate the 95th percentile exposures and populations for the CCL contaminants, we 
have assumed overlapping triangular distributions plotted between the modal value of the 
detection limit, the maximum occurrence value and centred on the median, values 
provided in the regulatory support literature (US EPA 2002 and 2003a to 2003l). The 95th 
percentile concentration thus calculated is assumed to affect 5% of the population. This is 
likely to be somewhat of an overestimate, given that water quality problems affect small 
systems disproportionately. Exposure estimates for pre-CCL contaminants are those 
described in the previous section with the exception of arsenic, for which one additional 
estimate is made: the population above the regulatory level at the time of regulation for 
the original NPDWR of 0.05 µg/L. This estimate is expressed as a range and was made 
on the same basis as the average and low population estimates from data on system 
violations described in the CWSS and summarized in Table 5.1. The low and average 
estimates were calculated assuming a 1% exceedance rate for arsenic. However, the value 
was reported as < 1%. Still, we saw in the previous section that the low end of the range 
can be a significant underestimate, so the lower end of an estimate for 1% might be a 
good approximation for < 1%. 
As a general guideline, EPA generally considers lifetime risks on the order of one in a 
million to be small or de minimis, and risks on the order of one in ten thousand to be 
significant. Along these lines, we find two contaminants that present large risks to the 
more highly exposed population: aldrin and dieldrin, with additional lifetime risks on the 
order of 1.4 in 1000. Beyond these two contaminants, 1,1,2-2-tetrachloroethane may 
represent a substantial risk to some populations, with a 95th percentile value between 3.3 
in 1000 and 6.7 in 1 000 000, according to the UCM Round 1 and Round 2 data, 
respectively. Populations exposed to risks at levels equal or greater to these are estimated 
at 40 000 and 230 000 respectively. 1,3-dichloropropene presents a 95th percentile risk 
between 7.6 in 100 000 and 4.3 in 1 000 000 according to Round 2 and Round 1 data 
respectively. Populations exposed to risks equal or greater to this are estimated at 58 550 
and 100 800, respectively. 
Notably, aldrin and dieldrin were not regulated because of their rare occurrence and 
because occurrence is expected to decline in future years as these compounds are no 
longer in use. The risk levels cited above assume lifetime exposure, and so occurrence 
over a smaller timeframe will reduce the risk accordingly. This would be the case if 
exposure to aldrin and dieldrin declines over a period of less than a generation. It is 
unclear whether this is indeed happening; usage was discontinued in 1989 (ASTDR, 
2002) and significant levels remain in the drinking water. Regardless of future trends in 
 78 
drinking water occurrence, this decision contrasts to earlier policies of regulating 
preemptively where there was an opportunity to protect public health.   
The large majority of carcinogenic drinking water contaminants currently regulated under 
the SDWA were regulated under the 1986 Amendments. As we have seen, occurrence 
data were not available at that time for most of these contaminants. Still, these 
contaminants can be evaluated in terms of the additional cancer risk posed at the level of 
regulation as an indication of the maximum risk permitted attributable to each 
contaminant. We estimate the size of the population benefiting from regulation of arsenic 
at the 0.05 µg/L level in 1974 to be in the 5 to 37 million range. EPA’s estimate for the 
population size benefiting from regulation at the 0.01 µg/L level in 2001 is 11.7 million 
(US EPA, 2000). Populations benefiting from regulation of bromate and carbon 
tetrachloride were not estimated. Notably, however, for all regulated carcinogenic 
contaminants on which occurrence data were available at the time of regulation, with the 
exception of arsenic, bromate and carbon tetrachloride, we see that no populations were 
found to be exposed to levels at or above the ensuing regulatory level. That is, with those 
three exceptions noted, all regulated carcinogenic contaminants for which occurrence 
data were available at the time of regulation were regulated with a purely precautionary 
approach. The risk levels corresponding to the resulting regulatory level for these 
contaminants regulated on a precautionary basis are on the 2.2 in 1 000 000 to 8.4 in 
100 000 range.  
Therefore, the populations exposed to carcinogenic risks resulting from CCL 
contaminants at the time of their regulatory evaluation are in general larger than the 
populations that were facing comparable or smaller carcinogenic risks at the time of their 
regulation. It is however worth restating that the framework and dose-response data for 
this quantitative analysis was not in most cases available at the time of regulation of 
regulation of pre-CCL contaminants.   
5.5 Conclusions 
We have conducted a comprehensive analysis of occurrence patterns of the drinking 
water contaminants of interest to United States regulators from the 1960s to the 2010s. 
We have identified a shift in regulatory attention from contaminants widespread in 
drinking water supplies up to the 1970s towards contaminants that occur generally 
infrequently and at trace levels. We have also identified a decreasing tendency to regulate 
drinking water contaminants preemptively and increased burden to demonstrate nation-
wide benefits from proposed drinking water regulatory intervention. The combination of 
the shift in the nature of drinking water contaminants of interest with the decreased 
openness to precautionary regulation appears to have left regulators deadlocked. An 
analysis of regulation in terms of risks faced by exposed populations, and of the size of 
these populations, confirms that the opportunities to protect public health afforded by 
 79 
prospective regulation of today’s contaminants are comparable to those previously 
addressed by regulatory intervention. Studying the exposure profiles of drinking water 
contaminants which emerged in the past 40 years and the recent decision-making history 
of the EPA, it seems unlikely that many contaminants will be identified that are present 
sufficiently often and in sufficiently high concentrations to warrant regulation. The case 
of perchlorate demonstrates that regulation in this framework is not impossible, but 
contrasted with the outcomes of the 20 contaminants from CCL1 and CCl2, regulation 
nevertheless seems unlikely. Moreover, a final regulatory value for perchlorate has yet to 
be issued more than a decade after analytical chemistry techniques first enabled detection 
below a provisional reference dose, suggesting that the road to regulation for new 
contaminants may be difficult. (US EPA 2002b) 
The centralized nature of drinking water regulation in the United States does indeed 
imply that the costs and benefits of any proposed regulation should be shared somewhat 
equitably across the country. Significantly, the regulatory analysis for the CCL 
contaminants essentially stopped upon determination that each was not present with 
sufficient frequency across the country, presumably leaving the regulatory burden to 
more local levels of government. Individual states are free to enact regulations that may 
be appropriate on more local levels. However, the fact that only a handful of states have 
regulations beyond those required by the EPA implies that this is not happening in 
practice. This is possibly attributable to the expense of regulatory analysis, lack of 
technical expertise at the state level or public aversion to the state duplicating regulatory 
activity already covered at the federal level. A striking example of this last point is New 
Jersey Governor Chris Christie’s executive order number 2, given in 2010, that requires 
state agencies to “reduce or eliminate areas of regulation where federal regulation now 
adequately regulates the subject matter”.   
In the interest of public health protection, EPA could facilitate decision-making on the 
part of states having large populations that would benefit from regulation. We note that 
EPA essentially stops the regulatory analysis for a CCL contaminant once it has 
demonstrated that the contaminant does not occur at sufficiently high levels or with 
sufficient frequency to warrant regulation by EPA. However, it remains silent on the 
costs and benefits of regulation 1) by EPA itself or 2) on a more local level. Indeed, this 
analysis appears to fall well outside the framework in which regulatory evaluations are 
currently made. More generally, there is a need for a comprehensive reevaluation of how 
drinking water regulatory responsibility is divided among levels of government in order 
to develop a regulatory strategy compatible with the nature of today’s contaminants and 
protective of public health at a reasonable cost.  
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CHAPTER 6 
Summary of research contributions 
The work presented in this thesis has grounded the candidate in the foundations of an 
integrated approach to water resources management and represents novel contributions to 
the extant sub-disciplines of drinking water and wastewater management and decision-
making.   
Chapter 1 uses CFD techniques to generate new understanding of the hydrodynamic 
characteristics and optimal operating conditions of a new type of wastewater treatment 
technology. 
Chapter 2 provides a framework for integrating newly accessible techniques in 
environmental fluid mechanics to wastewater management decision-making. It 
demonstrates the applicability of risk analysis techniques to structure CFD modelling 
research and outlines new paths of inquiry in ecological and economic impact valuation 
that would allow for this framework to become fully operational. 
Chapter 3 investigates a recurring claim that improved detection ability leads to 
regulations stricter than justified by available toxicological data. It outlines how the 
regulatory apparatus responds to emerging contaminants as a first step to developing a 
predictive regulatory structure. 
Chapter 4 explores centralized and decentralized approaches to managing drinking water 
in Canada from the perspective of theoretical risk management principles, risk 
perception, practical barriers such as the costs of decision-making and quality outcomes 
of disadvantaged populations. It finds that the popularly demanded greater centralization 
of regulatory responsibility is not likely to have intended outcomes of improved water 
quality, with the possible exception of native communities. It also finds that greater 
centralization will also make decision-making more complicated and likely slow 
responsiveness to emerging contaminants. 
Chapter 5 puts the history of drinking water decision-making in the US in the context of 
risk abatement to see if decisions to regulate and to not regulate have been consistent. It 
finds that as drinking water contaminants become rarer and the exposure landscape 
becomes more fragmented, contaminants tend not to be regulated, even where the risks 
are equal to or exceed risks addressed by previous regulations. This further points to the 
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Figure 1.2: CFD model geometry visualization 
 
 




Figure 1.4: Vertical  (Z-direction) velocity at three elevations in the bioreactor modelled in Run 22 
 
 
Figure 1.5: X-Y projection of velocity vector in the bioreactor modelled in Run 10 
 
 
 Figure 1.6: X-Y projection of velocity vector in the bioreactor modelled in Run 22 
  
















































































































































































Figure 3.1:  Relationships between public health goal (MCLG), regulation (MCL), and detection capability 













Figure 3.2: The three possible outcomes of a regulation revision triggered by advances in 





















Figure 3.3: Two competing conceptions of how regulations follow detection ability 
 Figure 4.1: Event tree connecting source water quality to drinking water quality 
through degree and effectiveness of regulation (abridged) 
  
Figure 4.2: Event tree connecting source water quality to drinking water quality 
through degree and effectiveness of regulation (expanded) 
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